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ABSTRACT 
Key to the constitutional design of the federal government is the 
separation of powers. An important support for that separation is the 
Appointments Clause, which governs how officers of the United States are 
installed in their positions. Although the separation of powers generally, 
and the Appointments Clause specifically, support democratically 
accountable government, they also protect individual citizens against 
abusive government power. But without a judicial remedy, such protection 
is ineffectual—a mere parchment barrier. 
Such has become the fate of the Appointments Clause in the D.C. 
Circuit, thanks to that court’s adoption—and zealous employment—of the 
rule that agency action, otherwise unconstitutional under the clause, may 
be “ratified” by a constitutionally competent officer. This ratification 
precludes a court from addressing a plaintiff’s constitutional claims 
against the original agency action. It is deemed effective regardless of 
whether it comports with the procedural and substantive limitations 
applicable to the original action. It is effective as well even if the ratifying 
federal actor makes no effort to abandon the decision-making procedures 
that led to the alleged constitutional violation. 
The D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense should be abandoned. It 
cannot be squared with United States Supreme Court ratification 
jurisprudence in analogous contexts, the doctrine of ratification as 
traditionally understood at common law, or an appropriately vigorous 
judicial enforcement of the separation of the powers. But if the D.C. 
Circuit (or the Supreme Court, once it has the opportunity to address the 
question) does not wish to discard the doctrine altogether, at the very least 
it should limit the doctrine’s application to cases where the official’s 
 
* Senior Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. Several of my colleagues and I represented the plaintiff-
appellants in Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2020), discussed passim. 
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ratification adheres to all of the substantive and significant procedural 
requirements that typically govern the type of action being ratified. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches is a fundamental part of the Constitution’s design for the 
federal government.1 This separation is protected by a number of checks 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“The Constitution 
sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal government into three defined categories, 
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on how the three branches of government may exercise their assigned 
power. One of those checks is the Appointments Clause,2 which sets forth 
how officers of the United States are installed in their positions. Among 
other things, the Appointments Clause limits who among the executive 
and judicial branches may appoint officers, while also reserving some 
legislative oversight (through the Senate confirmation process) for officer 
appointments.3 Securing an appointment consistent with the Appointments 
Clause is important because officials who have not been properly 
appointed are precluded from validly executing the powers assigned to 
their offices.4 
Although the separation of powers helps secure democratically 
responsive government, it does more than that. The doctrine also protects 
liberty, and, to that extent, it establishes a legal right that citizens may use 
to defend themselves against abusive governmental action.5 Over the last 
several decades, litigation concerning the Appointments Clause—and the 
United States Supreme Court’s interest in those lawsuits—has increased 
sharply,6 due in part to a concern that the blending of supposedly separate 
powers of the federal government has occurred too often.7 
Without a remedy, there is no legally protectable right.8 Thus, if a 
citizen is wronged by a federal official who holds office 
unconstitutionally—for example, a career civil servant wielding 
 
legislative, executive and judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each Branch of government 
would confine itself to its assigned responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the 
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, 
must be resisted.”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (“This Court has also held that the 
‘appropriate’ remedy for an adjudication tainted with an appointments violation is a new ‘hearing 
before a properly appointed’ official.” (quoting Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183, 188 
(1995))). 
 5. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (“Separation-of-powers principles are 
intended, in part, to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the dynamic 
between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitution’s concern. The structural 
principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well.”). 
 6. See infra notes 39–50. 
 7. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 115–16 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“We have not always been vigilant about protecting the structure of our Constitution. Although this 
Court has repeatedly invoked the ‘separation of powers’ and ‘the constitutional system of checks and 
balances’ as core principles of our constitutional design, essential to the protection of individual 
liberty, it has also endorsed a ‘more pragmatic, flexible approach’ to that design when it has seemed 
more convenient to permit the powers to be mixed. As the history shows, that approach runs the risk 
of compromising our constitutional structure.” (citations omitted)). 
 8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he 
receives an injury.”). 
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significant and independent authority who has not been nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate—but the citizen is precluded from 
obtaining redress for that wrong, then the safeguards of the Appointments 
Clause might as well not exist. That unfortunate state of affairs is fast 
approaching in the D.C. Circuit. For entrenched in that circuit’s case law 
is the principle that a constitutionally competent officer’s ratification can 
cure an Appointments Clause violation.9 Such a rule seems innocuous if 
one interprets “ratification” to mean doing correctly the same thing that 
was originally done incorrectly. But this is not what the D.C. Circuit 
intends. Rather, the D.C. Circuit means that, so long as a constitutionally 
competent officer makes a good faith affirmance of an action allegedly 
taken in violation of the Appointments Clause, the validity of the original 
action will be upheld retroactively.10 That consequence follows even if the 
ratifying act is a mere “rubberstamp”11 that would not satisfy the 
procedural and substantive rules governing the original action, such as 
those imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act.12 It also follows even 
if the ratifying principal has shown no interest in abandoning the 
procedures that led to the alleged constitutional violation.13 
This incredibly government-friendly and Appointments-Clause-
evading rule derives from two D.C. Circuit decisions14 from the 1990s: 
FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc.15 and Doolin Security Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Office of Thrift Supervision.16 Although followed (and expanded upon) in 
the D.C. Circuit and in other jurisdictions, the rule stands on rather slim 
grounds; it could not, for example, be justified under the common law of 
ratification.17 Given the importance of the Appointments Clause to the 
Constitution’s structure,18 as well as administrative law’s emphasis on 
 
 9. See, e.g., Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2020); Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v. 
NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 371–72 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty 
Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 117–18 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 10. See, e.g., FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 11. See id. at 709. 
 12. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706; see Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 29–30. 
 13. See Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 29–30. 
 14. See Intercollegiate, 796 F.3d at 117–18. Other circuits, citing the same D.C. Circuit 
precedents, have followed course. See, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 
1191–92 (9th Cir. 2016); Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 603–05 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
 15. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704. 
 16. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 17. See infra Section V.B. 
 18. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). 
2021] Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare 775 
 
following correct procedure,19 there is no compelling reason to loosen the 
requisites of common law ratification when dealing with attempted agency 
ratifications. Yet the decisions adopting the ratification defense do 
precisely that, holding that the rules should be less strict when ratification 
is employed to save agency action from an Appointments Clause attack.20 
In this Article, I endeavor to make three basic points. First, the D.C. 
Circuit’s ratification defense to Appointments Clause challenges cannot 
be reconciled with the U.S. Supreme Court’s handling of ratification in 
analogous contexts. Second, the D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense cannot 
be reconciled with the doctrine of ratification as traditionally understood 
at common law. Third, eliminating or at least sharply narrowing the D.C. 
Circuit’s ratification defense—to cases in which, for example, the 
proposed ratification comports with all of the substantive and significant 
procedural limitations normally applicable to the government act to be 
ratified—will more effectively police agency misbehavior under the 
Appointments Clause. 
The Article begins with a review of the Appointments Clause and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting it.21 Next, the Article assesses the 
doctrine of ratification as initially expounded at common law in various 
treatises and then examines the Supreme Court’s application of the 
doctrine in a variety of contexts.22 Following that, the Article evaluates the 
D.C. Circuit’s employment of ratification, giving special attention to the 
court’s mishandling of the doctrine as a fool-proof defense against 
Appointments Clause lawsuits.23 Finally, the Article attacks the D.C. 
Circuit’s misuse of the doctrine as inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent, as well as the common law, and then rounds off the discussion 
with a policy-based critique of the doctrine.24 
 
 19. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for 
its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))). 
 20. See, e.g., Moose Jooce v. FDA, No. 18-cv-203 (CRC), 2020 WL 680143, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 
11, 2020) (“Agency ratifications, which by definition come after a final action has been taken, are not 
governed by standard APA rules.”); Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 44 (D.D.C. 2017) 
(“[T]he question presented is one of administrative law, i.e., whether the current Secretary can ratify 
a rule that his agency, under the stewardship of his predecessor, had the legal authority to promulgate. 
The Restatement of Agency seems ill-suited to answer that question.”); State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring 
v. Lew, 197 F. Supp. 3d 177, 184 (D.D.C. 2016) (declining to impose “formalistic procedural 
requirements before a ratification is deemed to be effective”). 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Parts II–III. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
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I. A BACKGROUND ON THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
The Appointments Clause provides that the President: 
[S]hall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, 
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments.25 
In the form we know it today, the Appointments Clause did not incite 
controversy during the Constitutional Convention.26 Despite the lack of 
attention, the clause “reflects more than a ‘frivolous’ concern for ‘etiquette 
or protocol.’”27 The Founders wanted to ensure political accountability for 
appointees and to impose a check on the accumulation of power.28 The 
clause therefore is “among the significant structural safeguards of the 
constitutional scheme,”29 functioning as “a bulwark against one branch 
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch” and thereby 
“preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.”30 As a key to 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
 26. As to the first part of the Clause, see Brent Wible, Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule: From 
Polarization to a Consensus- and Moderation-Forcing Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations, 13 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 923, 940 (2005) (“Curiously, without further discussion, the Convention 
as a whole approved the clause unanimously on September 7, just ten days before it adopted the new 
Constitution.”). As to the concluding “Excepting Clause,” see Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 
660 (1997) (noting that the clause “was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand 
Convention, with little discussion”). There were, however, leading up to the Convention’s final votes, 
a number of competing proposals for allocating the appointment power, Theodore Y. Blumoff, 
Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1062 
(1987) (“Like the states themselves, their representatives in the Convention had almost as many ideas 
about the rightful locus of the appointing prerogative as there were representatives.”), although the 
debates over them mainly concerned the appointment of judges, id. at 1062–65. 
 27. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 
73, 74 (2007) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 28. Note, Congressional Restrictions on the President’s Appointment Power and the Role of 
Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1917–18 (2007); 
see Blumoff, supra note 26, at 1066 (“Rather, the debate focused largely on two questions: Was the 
Executive or the Legislature more likely to abuse its power? And which entity, the Executive or the 
Legislature, was more likely to be jealous and create discord if it was not given a role in the process?”). 
 29. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659. 
 30. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 
878 (1991)). 
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preserving the separation of powers, the clause serves “to protect 
individual liberty.”31 
The Appointments Clause creates two sets of distinctions: one 
between “Officers of the United States” and non-officer federal 
employees; and another between principal (or, better, non-inferior)32 
officers and inferior officers. For the first distinction, to be considered an 
officer rather than an employee, a person must occupy a continuing 
position established by law and wield significant federal authority.33 As to 
the second distinction, an inferior officer is one whose work is directed 
and supervised by a non-inferior officer.34 Whether such direction and 
supervision is present depends on a number of factors, including the extent 
to which (1) the official is protected from removal, (2) the official’s day-
to-day work is overseen by others, and (3) the official has the power to 
render a final decision without approval from the official’s superiors.35 
Whether one is a non-officer employee, an inferior officer, or a non-
inferior officer determines how easily one can be dismissed from 
government service, as well as the manner by which one assumes an 
office. For example, a federal employee typically enjoys substantial 
protection against loss of employment.36 Federal officers, however, 
 
 31. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 949 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting NLRB 
v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 571 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
 32. Most cases refer to non-inferior officers as “principal officers,” but the term does not appear 
in the Appointments Clause. It is used elsewhere in the Constitution, but the way in which it is 
employed suggests that there can be only one “principal” officer in each department of the government. 
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, of the 
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices . . . .”). Does that mean that there are only a handful of non-inferior officers in the 
federal government? By no means. Madison’s notes from the Constitutional Convention reveal that 
there are really three classes of officers: principal officers, “superior” officers, and inferior (or 
“minute”) officers, and only for the last category may their appointments be vested in the President, 
the courts of law, or the heads of departments. Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Why Robert 
Mueller’s Appointment as Special Counsel Was Unlawful, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87, 135–38 
(2019). 
 33. E.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (first citing United States v. Germaine, 99 
U.S. 508, 510 (1878); and then Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)). A powerful 
originalist argument has recently been made that an officer of the United States is “one whom the 
government entrusts with ongoing responsibility to perform a statutory duty of any level of 
importance.” Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 
454 (2018). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that administrative patent judges are non-
inferior officers largely (if not entirely) because, by statute, they have been granted the power to issue 
final decisions in inter partes patent challenges. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1985–
86 (2021).  
 34. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662. 
 35. Id. at 663–66. 
 36. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503, 7513(b) (outlining notice and hearing requirements for 
disciplinary action). See generally U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., WHAT IS DUE PROCESS IN FEDERAL 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT? 27–31 (2015). 
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generally enjoy much less (or even no) protection.37 As between inferior 
and non-inferior officers,38 the appointment of the former may be vested 
by Congress in the President alone, the courts of law, or the heads of 
departments,39 thereby avoiding Senate confirmation, whereas the latter 
must receive the Senate’s advice and consent. Thus, the distinctions 
among officer types that the Appointments Clause creates can affect the 
President’s ability to implement policies to effectively govern the entire 
Executive Branch, as well as Congress’s ability to exercise meaningful 
control over Executive Branch appointments. 
Appointments Clause challenges and related claims are now a fairly 
regular part of the Supreme Court’s docket. Since the re-emergence of 
Appointments Clause litigation in the modern era in Buckley v. Valeo40 
(which concerned the constitutionality of congressionally appointed 
voting members of the Federal Election Commission), the Court has 
addressed challenges to the appointments, or limitations on removal from 
 
 37. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (explaining 
that the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed forbids removal protections 
for officers who wield significant executive power). Some degree of protection against removal is, 
however, permissible for inferior officers. See id. at 2199 (first citing United States v. Perkins, 116 
U.S. 483 (1886); and then Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)). 
 38. As discussed above, it is more accurate to speak of inferior and non-inferior officers than of 
inferior and “principal” officers because there are a number of non-principal officers who nevertheless 
are non-inferior, i.e., superior, and who can be appointed only by the President with the Senate’s advice 
and consent. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 39. Interestingly, the Excepting Clause was “the least discussed portion of the Appointments 
Clause” during the Constitutional Convention. Blumoff, supra note 26, at 1068. The authorization for 
inferior appointments by the “courts of law” has generally been interpreted to allow for appointment 
by a single judge of the pertinent court (for example, the chief judge of the Tax Court, Freytag v. 
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870–71, 891–92 (1991)), although there is some academic dissent from that 
position. See James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior Officers, and the “Court 
of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1131 (2013) (“An inferior officer must be inferior to 
a superior and Article III makes clear that the Court, rather than the Chief Justice, occupies the relevant 
position of superiority.”). The term “heads of departments” denotes the chief officers of “‘a part or 
division of the executive government, as the Department of State, or of the Treasury,’ expressly 
‘creat[ed]’ and ‘giv[en] . . . the name of a department’ by Congress.” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (quoting 
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1878)). 
 40. Cf. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. 
O.L.C. 73, 86 (2007) (observing that Buckley was “the Court’s first treatment of the basic requirements 
of the Appointments Clause since Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890), see Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. at 125–26, n.162, and its first decision finding a violation of that Clause”).  
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office,41 of the following: administrative patent judges,42 the director of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,43 members of the Financial 
Oversight and Management Board of Puerto Rico,44 administrative law 
judges within the Security and Exchange Commission,45 the acting 
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,46 the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board,47 the National Labor Relations 
Board,48 the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals,49 special trial judges 
within the Tax Court,50 and the Office of Independent Counsel.51 
With this background on the Appointments Clause, we may now 
proceed to consider the common law origins of the ratification doctrine. 
II. THE COMMON LAW OF RATIFICATION 
The common law of ratification, like the common law of agency52 of 
which it is a part, derives from Roman law.53 Traditionally, ratification has 
been understood as a defense that an agent has against a charge that the 
 
 41. In addition to issues concerning the Appointments Clause, the Court has shown considerable 
interest in the extent to which the President’s power to remove federal officials from their positions 
may be circumscribed. Although the latter issue directly concerns the President’s obligation to execute 
the laws of the United States under the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, see Free Enter. 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492–93 (2010), the Appointments Clause 
nevertheless typically looms large in such removal cases. That is because limitations on the President’s 
power to remove are allowed for non-officer civil servants, see id. at 506, as well as for some inferior 
and (perhaps a handful of) non-inferior officers, see Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192. 
 42.  United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021). 
 43. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. 2183. The Court recently applied the rule of Seila Law to invalidate 
removal protections for the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Collins v. Yellen, 141 
S. Ct. 1761, 1783–84 (2021). 
 44. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020). 
 45. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 46. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017). 
 47. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 48. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
 49. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997). 
 50. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
 51. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 52. Interestingly, the “title agency, as the name of a distinct subject, belongs to a comparatively 
recent period in our law[;] Blackstone scarcely refers to it.” FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF AGENCY § 11, at 5 (2d ed. 1914); cf. id. § 4, at 6 (referencing English law prior to Edward I, 
“there is no current word that is equivalent to our agent; John does not receive money or chattels ‘as 
agent for’ Roger; he receives it to the use of Roger (ad opus Rogeri)”) (quoting 1 SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF 
EDWARD I, at 228 (2d ed. 1898)). Professor Mechem was the original reporter for the First Restatement 
of Agency, and his treatise was widely recognized as the leading work on the subject in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Deborah A. DeMott, The First Restatement of Agency: What Was 
the Agenda?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 17, 18 (2007). 
 53. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 239, at 299–301 (8th rev. ed., 
N. St. John Green ed. 1874). 
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agent exceeded the principal’s mandate.54 It is founded upon the maxim 
omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato priori aequiparatur, that is, 
every ratification relates back and is equivalent to a prior authorization55—
in Justice Story’s estimation, a “most useful and convenient rule.”56 
There are, however, limitations on the power to ratify, which Justice 
Story’s well-regarded treatise on agency elaborates.57 First, a principal 
cannot achieve more through ratification than the principal could if the 
principal had done the agent’s act in the first instance.58 Second, a 
ratification “cannot . . . stand upon a higher ground, than an original 
authority,”59 i.e., a principal’s ratification is effective only if it is subject 
to the same procedures and constraints that governed the  
agent’s action. Third, the principal must have full knowledge of all the 
material circumstances of the original transaction.60 Fourth, the  
ratification cannot operate so as to subject a third party to damages or other 
injury, or to defeat a vested right or estate.61 Fifth, a principal must accept 
or reject the act in its entirety to be ratified.62 Finally, a ratification is 
ineffective if the agent did not commit the act with the explicit intent of 
doing so on the principal’s behalf.63 
 
 54. Id. § 239, at 298; see 1 SAMUEL LIVERMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND 
AGENT; AND OF SALES BY AUCTION § 4, at 50 (1818). 
 55. STORY, supra note 53, § 239, at 299; LIVERMORE, supra note 54, § 4, at 44; 2 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 616 (12th ed. O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed.) (1896). Even without actual 
authorization, a principal can be liable for the actions of his agent. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. 
v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1982) (“[U]nder general rules of agency law, principals 
are liable when their agents act with apparent authority . . . .”). 
 56. STORY, supra note 53, § 239, at 299–300. 
 57. See, e.g., FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT v (1903) 
(“The author desires to express his obligation to the many writers who have contributed to formulate 
and classify this branch of the law,—and particularly to Story, whose Commentaries are still 
indispensable to the student . . . .”). 
 58. See STORY, supra note 53, § 241, at 302. As the maxim provides, “Quod ab initio non valet, 
tractu temporis non convalescit.” Id. So, for example, a principal has no power to ratify an agent’s act 
that was and is illegal. 
 59. Id. § 242, at 303; TIFFANY, supra note 57, at 61–62; MECHEM, supra note 52, § 419, at 309–
10. 
 60. STORY, supra note 53, §§ 242–43, at 303–04; TIFFANY, supra note 57, at 72; MECHEM, 
supra note 52, § 393, at 285–86; KENT, supra note 55, at 616 n.1. 
 61. STORY, supra note 53, § 246, at 307; TIFFANY, supra note 57, at 77–78; MECHEM, supra 
note 52, §§ 486–87, at 356–58. 
 62. STORY, supra note 53, § 250, at 310; TIFFANY, supra note 57, at 61; MECHEM, supra note 
52 § 410, at 301. 
 63. STORY, supra note 53, § 251a, at 311; TIFFANY, supra note 57, at 54; MECHEM, supra note 
52, § 377, at 275. As the maxim provides, “Ratum quis habere non potest, quod ipsius nomine non est 
gestum.” STORY, supra note 53, § 251a, at 311. 
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The doctrine of ratification as explicated by Justice Story and other 
classic treatise writers (who are in accord with Story64) has been preserved 
by and large in the Restatements of Agency.65 For example, the Second 
Restatement defines ratification as “the affirmance by a person of a prior 
act which did not bind him but which was done, or professedly done on 
his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as 
if originally authorized by him.”66 Ratification is not effective “unless the 
one acting purported to be acting for the ratifier.”67 Ignorance of material 
facts also precludes ratification.68 Ratification is precluded as well if it 
occurs outside of the time allowed for the original act, or otherwise works 
to deprive third parties of rights already tested in litigation,69 or is not 
subject to the same formalities governing the original act.70 
The Third Restatement, although much shorter in its treatment of 
ratification than the Second, more or less maintains the latter’s approach. 
“Ratification is the affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the 
act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual authority.”71 
Among the requirements for ratification are that the person ratifying must 
have the capacity to do so,72 the ratification must be timely,73 and the agent 
must have purported to act on the principal’s behalf.74 The Third 
Restatement does, however, depart from the Second in a few ways. For 
example, the Third Restatement does not require a principal to have the 
 
 64. See supra notes 53–62. 
 65. The First Restatement on Agency, published in 1933, closely follows the law as stated in 
Tiffany (1903) and Mechem (1925). See supra notes 56–62; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
AGENCY § 82 (AM. L. INST. 1933) (“Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did 
not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or 
all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him.”); id. § 89 (“At the election of the third 
person, an affirmance of a transaction with him is not effective as ratification if it occurs after the 
situation has so materially changed that it would be inequitable to subject him to liability thereon.”); 
id. § 91 (“If, at the time of affirmance, the purported principal is ignorant of material facts involved in 
the original transaction, he may elect to avoid the effect of the affirmance . . . .”); id. § 93(2) (“Where 
formalities are requisite for the authorization of an act, its affirmance must be by the same formalities 
in order to constitute a ratification.”); id. § 96 (“A contract or other single transaction must be affirmed 
in its entirety in order to effect its ratification.”); id. § 101(c) (“Ratification is not effective . . . in 
diminution of the rights or other interests of persons not parties to the transaction which were acquired 
in the subject matter before affirmance.”). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (AM. L. INST. 1958). 
 67. Id. § 85. 
 68. Id. § 91(1). 
 69. See id. § 90. 
 70. Id. § 93(2). 
 71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(1) (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
 72. Id. § 4.01(3)(b). Capacity is defined as the power to do the act of the agent oneself. 
Id. § 3.04(1). 
 73. Id. § 4.01(3)(c).  
 74. Id. § 4.03. 
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capacity to ratify at the time of the original action.75 Further, in 
determining the timeliness of a ratification, the Third Restatement focuses 
on whether the interests of third parties have developed since the original 
act such that the act’s ratification would have “adverse and inequitable 
effects on the rights of third parties.”76 And unlike the Second 
Restatement, the Third Restatement does not directly address whether the 
formalities of the original act must be repeated, although one could argue 
that this requirement is impliedly incorporated in the Third Restatement’s 
discussion of capacity.77 But aside from these small differences, the Third 
Restatement follows the Second, as well as the treatise writers, in viewing 
ratification as part of the law of agency. The Third Restatement also 
follows the Second in giving the doctrine a wide ambit of application but 
also in imposing a number of limitations on a principal’s power to ratify, 
largely to protect the rights of third parties. 
With this background on the common law rules governing 
ratification, we may now proceed to review how the U.S. Supreme Court 
has employed the doctrine. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF THE DOCTRINE OF RATIFICATION 
By far the Supreme Court’s most common use of the term 
“ratification” is in the context of treaties, especially with  
respect to the Constitution and its amendments,78 but also with respect to 
Native American tribes and foreign nations,79 and compacts  
 
 75. Id. §§ 4.04(1)(b), § 4.04 cmt. b. 
 76. Id. § 4.05. The Third Restatement retreats somewhat from the Second in its handling of the 
limitation as applied to litigation. The Second Restatement generally approves of the rule precluding 
ratification when it “deprive[s] the other party to a transaction with an unauthorized agent of rights he 
otherwise would have and might defeat, as the normal effect of ratification does not, his legitimate 
expectations.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 90 rep. note. Although acknowledging that 
“some courts treat the [aforementioned rule] as a basis for limiting defenses that may be asserted in 
litigation,” the Third Restatement concludes that “the conceptual basis for so doing is not clear.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.05 cmt. e. 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(1) (“An individual has capacity to act as 
principal in a relationship of agency . . . if, at the time the agent takes action, the individual would 
have capacity if acting in person.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687–88 (2019); cf. U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII. 
 79. See, e.g., McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 (2020); GE Energy Power Conversion 
Fr. SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1645–47 (2020); cf. U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2. 
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among the states.80 This usage of “ratification” is, however, largely 
irrelevant to our present inquiry.81 
Occasionally and in a somewhat different setting, the Court will 
employ  the so-called “ratification canon,” according to which the Court 
will presume that when Congress reenacts a statute, Congress intends to 
codify any judicial constructions of the original text.82 The Court also 
sometimes denotes as “ratification” the circumstance when Congress, 
acting as the principal, ratifies an otherwise unauthorized official action.83 
There have been passing discussions of “ratification” in other 
contexts as well. For example, a decision concerning the Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act discusses whether a discharged worker’s retention 
of severance pay ratified her otherwise statutorily invalid promise not to 
sue over her discharge.84 A few other decisions address ratification in the 
context of labor law, specifically the process whereby union members 
“ratify” a proposed collective bargaining agreement.85 
With respect to ratification as a part of the law of agency, the Court 
has generally accepted, without much elaboration or citation, the 
 
 80. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 138 S. Ct. 954, 957 (2018); cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 81. But it is not entirely irrelevant. For example, the process whereby the states “ratify” a 
constitutional amendment is somewhat analogous to a principal-agent relationship, with Congress or 
a Constitutional Convention serving as the agent of the people of the several states. See generally U.S. 
CONST. art. V. But it is not the same type of principal-agent relationship that ratification—in the sense 
that we are interested here—is concerned. For ratification, the act being ratified is something that the 
principal, by definition, could have done in the first instance. In contrast, the states as states (or the 
people acting through their state governments) cannot propose a constitutional amendment; only 
Congress or a convention convened by the states’ legislatures can propose such an amendment. See 
id. 
 82. E.g., Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2365–66 (2019). The term 
is also used to describe when, by virtue of congressional or executive action, just compensation is 
authorized for what otherwise would have been a non-compensable tort. See United States v. Goltra, 
312 U.S. 203, 208–10 (1941). 
 83. E.g., Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 301–02 (1937); accord Charlotte 
Harbor & N. Ry. Co. v. Welles, 260 U.S. 8, 11 (1922) (“The general and established proposition is 
that what the Legislature could have authorized, it can ratify if it can authorize at the time of 
ratification.”); Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 690 (1878) (“If Congress or the 
legislative assembly had the power to commit to the board the duty of making the improvements, and 
[the power] to prescribe that the assessments should be made in the manner in which they were made, 
it had power to ratify the acts which it might have authorized.”). 
 84. Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 425–28 (1998). This is not ratification 
under the law of agency but rather the law of contract, whereby a contractual party may “ratify” an 
otherwise voidable contractual obligation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (AM. L. 
INST. 1981). 
 85. E.g., Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010). 
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principles set forth by the treatise writers.86 These principles include the 
following rules: (1) ratification operates as a retroactive authorization;87 
(2) a principal cannot ratify what the principal could not do directly;88 (3) 
the transaction must be ratified in its entirety, if at all;89 (4) the principal 
must have full knowledge of the material facts90 (although  
acceptance of the benefits of an action can operate as an implied 
ratification91); (5) ratification cannot defeat the rights of  
third parties;92 and, more generally, (6) a principal must have power to do 
the original act at the time of ratification.93 
 
 86. See, e.g., Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 483 (1901) (citing, inter alia, Justice Story’s 
treatise as well as Mr. Livermore’s) (reciting the basic aspects of the doctrine and declaring that they 
“are well known, and may be found laid down in the following text-books and authorities”); Fleckner 
v. Bank of the U.S., 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 338, 363 (1823) (“No maxim is better settled in reason and 
law, than the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato priori equiparatur . . . .”). Sometimes 
the Court would combine citations to Justice Story and other treatise writers with citations to a variety 
of state court decisions. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Schenk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 772, 781–82 (1866). 
And sometimes no citation at all would be given, presumably because the principles enunciated were 
commonly known and accepted. See, e.g., Drakely v. Gregg, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 242, 267 (1868); Boyle 
v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 658 (1832). 
 87. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121 (1933) (“[R]atification is equivalent to antecedent 
delegation of authority . . . .”); Clark’s Ex’rs v. Van Riemsdyk, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 153, 161 (1815) 
(“It will not be denied that the acts of an agent, done without authority, may be so ratified and 
confirmed by his principals as to bind them in like manner as if an original authority had existed.”). A 
principal, however, retains the right to choose whether to ratify. William W. Bierce, Ltd. v. Hutchins, 
205 U.S. 340, 346 (1907) (“So a man may ratify or repudiate an unauthorized act done in his name.”). 
 88. Marsh v. Fulton Cnty., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 676, 684 (1870) (“It follows that a ratification can 
only be made when the party ratifying possesses the power to perform the act ratified.”); United States 
v. Grossmayer, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 72, 75 (1869) (“[A] transaction originally unlawful cannot be made 
any better by being ratified.”); see Bunch v. Cole, 263 U.S. 250, 254 (1923) (“These leases were made 
in violation of a congressional prohibition. They were not merely voidable at the election of the 
allottee, but absolutely void and not susceptible of ratification by him.”). 
 89. Gaines v. Miller, 111 U.S. 395, 398 (1884) (“If a principal ratifies that which favors him, he 
ratifies the whole.”). 
 90. E.g., United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 354 (1901); Owings v. Hull, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 607, 
629 (1835); see Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 573 (1982) 
(rejecting ratification as the basis for assigning an agent’s antitrust violation to its principal because 
such a standard would allow a principal to “avoid liability by ensuring that it remained ignorant of its 
agents’ conduct, and the antitrust laws would therefore encourage [the principal] to do as little as 
possible to oversee its agents”); Knapp v. Alexander-Edgar Lumber Co., 237 U.S. 162, 170 (1915) 
(“To the suggestion that plaintiff has ratified the compromise, . . . it is sufficient to say that it is not 
found that he did this with full knowledge of the facts.”). 
 91. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. United States, 244 U.S. 351, 358 (1917). 
 92. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 477 (1915) (“A subsequent ratification could 
have related back to 1851, but if the withdrawal was originally void, the ratification, of course, could 
not cut out intervening rights of settlers.”). 
 93. Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S. 332, 338 (1873) (“[I]t is essential that the party ratifying should be 
able not merely to do the act ratified at the time the act was done, but also at the time the ratification 
was made.”). 
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The Supreme Court’s most pertinent decision regarding the 
relationship of ratification to the Appointments Clause is FEC v. NRA 
Political Victory Fund.94 The FEC brought a lawsuit against a political 
action committee for violating various campaign finance laws. The district 
court held on the merits for the FEC, ruling that the PAC was guilty of 
campaign finance infractions. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Avoiding the 
merits, the court ruled for the PAC on the ground that the statutory 
allowance for two congressionally appointed non-voting members to serve 
on the FEC violates the Appointments Clause.95 The FEC then sought 
review in the Supreme Court but did not obtain the Solicitor General’s 
approval as required by the Judicial Code.96 After the time for filing a 
petition for writ of certiorari had expired, the Solicitor General attempted 
to ratify the FEC’s filing. The Supreme Court held that the Solicitor 
General’s action came too late.97 The Court acknowledged that the issue 
was “at least presumptively governed by principles of agency law, and in 
particular the doctrine of ratification.”98 The Court continued by observing 
 
 94. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994). In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), the Government argued that the petitioner 
should receive no relief because the challenged civil investigative demand had since been ratified by 
an officer properly accountable to the President. Id. at 2208. Noting that the question “turns on case-
specific factual and legal questions not addressed below and not briefed here,” the Court concluded 
that “the appropriate course” was to “remand for the lower Courts to consider those questions in the 
first instance.” Id. (On remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bureau director’s ratification, following 
its decision in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016), 
discussed infra n. 256, which relies heavily upon FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 
discussed in Part IV.B., infra.) The Court in Lucia v. SEC also sidestepped ratification. There, the 
petitioner contested the validity of the SEC’s ratification of its prior administrative law judge 
appointments but, because the government on remand did not propose to retry the petitioner before a 
“ratified” ALJ, the Court saw no reason to address the ratification’s validity. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 
2044, 2055 n.6 (2018). 
 95. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826–27 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 96. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (“[T]he Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and 
argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . .”); 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (delegation from the 
Attorney General to the Solicitor General for “[c]onducting . . . all Supreme Court cases, 
including . . . petitions for . . . certiorari”). As a so-called independent agency, the FEC did not believe 
that it needed the Solicitor General’s approval to litigate its own cases. See NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 
513 U.S. at 97–98. 
 97. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S.  at 98. 
 98. Id. That the principal-agent relationship between government officials should be covered by 
the same principles applicable to private principal-agent relationships is not without precedent. See, 
e.g., United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 354 (1901) (“Where an agent has acted without authority 
and it is claimed that the principal has thereafter ratified his act, such ratification can only be based 
upon a full knowledge of all the facts upon which the unauthorized action was taken. This is as true in 
the case of the government as in that of an individual.”); Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U.S. 310, 314 (1892) 
(“[W]e know of no reason why the analogy of the law of principal and agent is not applicable here, 
viz., that an act in excess of an agent’s authority, when performed, becomes binding upon the principal, 
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that ratification applies only when the principal has the power to take the 
action to be ratified both at the time of the original action and at the time 
of the ratification.99 Because the time for filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari had run when the Solicitor General attempted to ratify, the 
second requirement for ratification could not be satisfied.100 
Thus, although not an Appointments Clause case, NRA Political 
Victory Fund provides some instruction for how the Supreme Court 
employs the doctrine of ratification when a government official uses it to 
retroactively justify a government action that is otherwise ultra vires. 
Perhaps the decision’s most important guidance is its reliance on the 
doctrine’s common law origins as well as its common law limitations to 
determine how the doctrine should apply to governmental acts.101 
IV. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S 
RATIFICATION DEFENSE TO APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CHALLENGES 
Thus far, we have reviewed the common law’s understanding of 
ratification and the Supreme Court’s use of the doctrine in a variety of 
contexts. This section will address the D.C. Circuit’s handling of the 
doctrine. It begins with an examination of the D.C. Circuit’s early 
employment of ratification principles (mostly outside of the Appointments 
Clause context); then describes the court’s creation of the ratification 
defense to Appointments Clause challenges in its 1996 decision, FEC v. 
Legi-Tech,102 and its 1998 decision, Doolin Security Savings Bank v. 
Office of Thrift Supervision;103 and then explains how later cases expanded 
the defense. It concludes with a discussion of the D.C. Circuit’s rule that 
ratification ends an Appointments Clause lawsuit by providing a complete 
defense on the merits, rather than by mooting the action. 
 
if subsequently ratified by him. The treaty does not provide how or when the permission of the 
president shall be obtained, and there is certainly nothing which requires that it shall be given before 
the deed is delivered.”). 
 99. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. at 98. 
 100. Id. at 98–99. Only one justice dissented, and that dissent was limited to whether the FEC 
needed to obtain the Solicitor General’s approval to file a certiorari petition. Id. at 100 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). As we shall see in the following section, the D.C. Circuit has largely limited 
NRA Political Victory Fund to a timing question—namely, whether something like a statute of 
limitations or similar time bar precludes officials from ratifying because they no longer have the power 
to do in the first instance the act proposed to be ratified. See, e.g., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1998); accord Advanced Disposal Servs. E., 
Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 604 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 101. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. at 98–99 (citing, inter alia, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 90). 
 102. FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 103. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision,139 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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A. The Search for Origins 
The first time the D.C. Circuit credited a defense of ratification to an 
Appointments Clause claim was in its 1996 decision, Legi-Tech—a 
decision to be addressed shortly.104 Although the ratification defense did 
not emerge out of thin air, it is fair to say that, until Legi-Tech and Doolin, 
it had little precedential support. 
In the hundred years prior to Legi-Tech, the D.C. Circuit had 
addressed “ratification” in several contexts outside the Appointments 
Clause. In these cases, ratification came up in circumstances similar to 
those in the Supreme Court decisions discussed in the preceding section.105 
For example, these early D.C. Circuit cases address the general common 
law rules of ratification,106 legislative ratification of otherwise 
unauthorized government actions,107 and ratification of union labor 
agreements,108 as well as ratification in the context of securities law.109 
The first D.C. Circuit decision that entertained something like a 
ratification defense to a claim that government officials acted illegally was 
the court’s 1966 per curiam decision in Dumbrowski v. Burbank.110 A civil 
 
 104. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 117–18 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (observing that “[t]his court has twice before considered the validity of decisions made after 
the replacement of an improperly appointed official” and then discussing Legi-Tech and Doolin). 
 105. See supra pp. 11–12. 
 106. Wittlin v. Giacalone, 171 F.2d 147, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (discussing ratification with full 
knowledge); Thompson v. Park Sav. Bank, 96 F.2d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Wash. Times Co. v. 
Wilder, 12 App. D.C. 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1898) (holding that acquiescence or failure to repudiate can 
result in a ratification). 
 107. Associated Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Morton, 507 F.2d 1167, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (discussing 
congressional ratification). 
 108. Am. Postal Workers Union, Headquarters Local 6885 v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-
CIO, 665 F.3d 1096, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 109. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 850 F.2d 742, 750 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing ratification as defense to unauthorized trading). 
 110. Dombrowski v. Burbank, 358 F.2d 821, 825 (1966) (per curiam). There are a few decisions 
articulating a similar defense of the de facto officer doctrine. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Greeting Card 
Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 569 F.2d 570, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Under that doctrine 
as traditionally understood, a plaintiff cannot challenge a governmental action on the ground that an 
official lacking authority did it. Rather, a plaintiff’s “recourse” is limited to a direct challenge to the 
official’s holding of the office. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
Nowadays, the de facto officer rule has been relaxed to allow for attacks on official action based on a 
defect in the responsible official’s delegation of authority, if the plaintiff brought his lawsuit about the 
time of the challenged action and the agency was on notice of the alleged appointment defect. Id. at 
1500. The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine is altogether inapplicable to at least some types 
of Appointments Clause challenges. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995) (“We think 
that one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer 
who adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits of the question and whatever relief may 
be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”). Although the Court has occasionally applied the 
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rights organization brought a Section 1983 action111 challenging a 
document subpoena issued by the chairman and chief counsel of the 
United States Senate’s Internal Security Subcommittee.112 The district 
court dismissed the action, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal, 
ruling that, whatever the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the 
chairman and counsel were protected from suit by the doctrine of 
legislative immunity.113 This conclusion was supported by the 
Subcommittee’s “ratification and consequent validation” of the subpoena. 
In the D.C. Circuit’s view, the subsequent Subcommittee action 
established that the defendants’ actions were “within the mainstream of 
legislative effort to a degree adequate to protect against liability in 
damages for issuing and executing the subpoena.”114 The court did not, 
however, address whether the Subcommittee’s ratification of the subpoena 
would be valid “for all purposes.”115 
After Dumbroski, the D.C. Circuit did not again consider a 
ratification defense to a challenge to government action until its 1987 
decision in Andrade v. Regnery.116 Demoted and laid off Department of 
Justice employees challenged the legality of that agency’s reduction-in-
force program.117 Among other things, the plaintiffs argued that the 
program was illegal because it had been created by officials serving in 
violation of the Appointments Clause.118 The district court rejected the 
Appointments Clause claim on a number of grounds, including that the 
program had been ratified by a properly appointed official.119 The D.C. 
 
doctrine, the opinion in Ryder distinguishes those decisions on the ground that they do not concern a 
“‘trespass upon the executive power of appointment,’” but rather “a misapplication of a statute.” Id. 
at 182 (quoting McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 598 (1895)). In any event, the de facto 
officer doctrine is distinct from ratification and perhaps a stronger defense because no subsequent 
governmental action is required. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 112. Dumbrowski, 358 F.2d at 822–24. 
 113. Id. at 826. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that there was a material question 
of fact as to whether the chief counsel was entitled to legislative immunity. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 
387 U.S. 82, 84–85 (1967) (per curiam). 
 114. Dumbrowski, 358 F.2d at 825; see McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1298 n. 78 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (following Dumbrowski on this point). 
 115. Dumbrowski, 358 F.2d at 825. It bears noting as well that what qualified as a “ratification” 
was essentially what would have been required in the first instance—namely, a vote of the full 
Subcommittee. 
 116. Andrade v. Regnery, 824 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In National Ass’n of Greeting Card 
Publishers v. U.S. Postal Service, the court raised, but did not decide, whether an agency may 
retroactively modify its rules to allow for ratification and then proceed to ratify. Nat’l Ass’n of 
Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 569 F.2d 570, 601 n.138 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 117. Andrade, 824 F.2d at 1254. 
 118. Id. at 1255. 
 119. Id. 
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the government 
but without addressing ratification.120 Rather, the court held that, because 
the source of the plaintiffs’ harm was the approval of the program and not 
the predicate steps taken to develop it, and because a properly appointed 
official approved the program, no violation of the Appointments Clause 
had injured the plaintiffs.121 In other words, regardless of whether the 
program’s approval might have impliedly ratified the steps taken to 
produce the program,122 the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge those 
predicate steps.123 The plaintiffs could only attack the approval itself, 
which was an action taken by a constitutionally competent officer. 
Ratification was therefore irrelevant. 
A few years later, the D.C. Circuit was presented with a true 
ratification defense to a charge of unconstitutional agency action. In 
Robertson v. FEC,124 the plaintiff (a 1988 presidential candidate) 
challenged the FEC’s determination that he had to repay certain campaign 
matching funds.125 Among the plaintiff’s grounds for contesting the 
repayment order was that the FEC’s structure violated the Appointments 
Clause.126 The plaintiff argued that the FEC’s structure was 
unconstitutional because, as the D.C. Circuit held in FEC v. NRA Political 
Victory Fund127 (a decision which, as we learned in the preceding section, 
the Supreme Court declined to hear because of the FEC’s untimely cert 
petition), two commission (although non-voting) memberships were 
allotted to congressional appointees.128 After NRA Political Victory Fund 
had been decided and while Robertson was still pending, the FEC voted 
“to ratify its past ‘actions in audits of publicly funded presidential 
campaigns,’ including this case.”129 The FEC therefore argued that any 
Appointments Clause defect in the enforcement action had been 
 
 120. See id. at 1256–57. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Of such a kind was the ratification approved in Doolin Security Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. 
Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 213–14 (D.C. Cir. 1998), discussed in the following section. 
 123. Andrade, 824 F.2d at 1257 (“[T]he particularized injury that permitted appellants to have 
standing to raise their claim was the loss of their jobs, not the mere fact that the government-initiated 
plans that could have resulted in their demotion or termination. It is the actual implementation of the 
[reduction-in-force program] which we have power to redress, and that action, it is clear, came at the 
hands of a duly appointed official.” (citation omitted)). 
 124. Robertson v. FEC, 45 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 125. Id. at 488–89. 
 126. Id. at 489. 
 127. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826–27 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 128. Those were the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. 
Robertson, 45 F.3d at 489. 
 129. Id. 
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remedied.130 The D.C. Circuit ruled for the agency but sidestepped the 
ratification issue by concluding that the plaintiff’s receipt of funds from 
the FEC estopped him from challenging the agency’s constitutionality.131 
In summary, the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of ratification, prior to its 
adoption of the ratification defense to Appointments Clause claims in 
Legi-Tech and Doolin, was generally consistent with the doctrine’s 
common law rules. Although the court occasionally considered 
application of the doctrine in the context of disputes about the propriety of 
official action, the court never during this period addressed the extent to 
which the doctrine would be available to defend against constitutional 
challenges to agency action. 
B. Using the Doctrine of Ratification to Resolve an Appointments Clause 
Challenge Without Actually Determining if the Appointments Clause Has 
Been Violated 
As this section will show, the Appointments Clause ratification 
defense arose from contested administrative enforcement actions.132 The 
defense then expanded to claim the territory of agency adjudications.133 
Along the way, the defense incorporated the rather dubious concept of 
“self-ratification,”134 whereby a properly appointed official seeks to 
validate actions that the same official took prior to the official’s proper 
appointment.135 Finally, the defense expanded to cover the entire field of 
administrative practice, including agency rule-making.136 
 
 130. See id. The plaintiff argued that the FEC lacked the power to ratify because it was an agent-
delegate of Congress, and hence only Congress as the principal could ratify by, presumably, amending 
the statute. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that the FEC could not ratify its prior acts because its 
organic statute forbids delegation to agents, and, in any event, the ratification was not the result of an 
independent reconsideration. Brief for Petitioners at 50–52, Robertson v. FEC, 45 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (No. 93-1698). The government responded that the plaintiff’s arguments were without merit 
because the FEC was in good faith ratifying its own acts, not those of any agent. Brief for Respondent 
at 46–48, Robertson v. FEC, 45 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (No. 93-1686). 
 131. Robertson, 45 F.3d at 490 (“Petitioner, after all, voluntarily accepted over $10 million in 
public funds disbursed at the Commission’s direction. It is hardly open to it now, after having taken 
the money, to claim that the very statutory instrumentality by which the funds are dispensed may not 
seek reimbursement because its composition is unconstitutional.”). 
 132. See FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (involving an FEC civil 
enforcement action); Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (involving an Office of Thrift Supervision administrative enforcement action). 
 133. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (setting royalty rate for internet-based webcasting of digitally recorded music). 
 134. See Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (affirming ratification of FDA rule 
“deeming” vaping products to be subject to the Tobacco Control Act). 
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This jurisprudential story begins with  FEC v. Legi-Tech. The FEC 
brought an enforcement action against Legi-Tech, a company that ran a 
computer database containing information on file with the agency.137 The 
FEC contended that Legi-Tech’s subscribers illegally used its database’s 
information to solicit campaign contributions.138 The district court 
dismissed the case on the ground that the D.C. Circuit in NRA Political 
Victory Fund had held the FEC’s structure to be unconstitutional and that 
the “FEC could not ‘circumvent’ [that holding] through its reconstitution 
and ratification of its former actions.”139 The D.C. Circuit reversed.140 
Although the court acknowledged that “some effects of the 
unconstitutional structure of the FEC [were] to be presumed to have 
impacted on the action” despite the agency’s ratification of its earlier 
decision to initiate an enforcement action against Legi-Tech, dismissal of 
the action to force the FEC to begin the enforcement process anew would 
be an improper remedy.141 “Even were the Commission to return to square 
one—assuming the statute of limitations was not a bar—it is virtually 
inconceivable that its decisions would differ in any way the second time 
from that which occurred the first time.”142 The court admitted that its 
ratification test would validate a “rubberstamp,”143 but concluded that a 
rule requiring anything more would necessitate a disfavored inquiry into 
the “internal deliberations” of government decision-making,144 or would 
amount to no more than a delay of the inevitable.145 
 
 137. See Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d 704. 
 138. Id. at 705–06. 
 139. Id. at 706. In the district court’s view, refusing to dismiss would have been tantamount to 
failing to give full retroactive effect to the D.C. Circuit’s decision in FEC v. NRA Political Victory 
Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Cf. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When 
this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation 
of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as 
to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.”). 
 140. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709. 
 141. Id. at 708. 
 142. Id. The court’s conclusion gives the impression that the predicate steps that were ratified 
were all ministerial or were driven by a record that could not change. Yet one of those predicate steps 
was “conciliation,” a type of (presumably very judgment-laden) mediation that the Commission must 
engage in with an alleged violator before bringing an enforcement action. See 52 
U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). 
 143. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. (“In any event, forcing the Commission to start at the beginning of the administrative 
process, given human nature, promises no more detached and ‘pure’ consideration of the merits of the 
case than the Commission’s ratification decision reflected.”). Notably, the FEC’s ratification defense 
was the very last item in its opening brief, receiving cursory treatment in the final paragraph; and none 
of the cases the FEC cited to support its ratification defense concerns the Appointments Clause. Brief 
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After Legi-Tech, it did not take the D.C. Circuit long to signal that 
the ratification defense was here to stay. In Doolin, a savings and loan 
challenged an order issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision, which 
concluded that the plaintiff financial firm had committed unsafe and 
unsound banking practices.146 The plaintiff argued that the order was 
invalid because, among other things, the original administrative complaint 
had been approved by an “acting” director who lacked the authority to 
initiate such an enforcement proceeding.147 The D.C. Circuit avoided this 
question of authority by holding that, even assuming that the acting 
director’s decision to file an administrative complaint was ultra vires, the 
action had been ratified when the acting director’s permanent successor 
issued the order determining that the plaintiff was guilty of the charges 
alleged in the complaint.148 The court reasoned that, by finding the plaintiff 
guilty, the permanent director had necessarily affirmed his predecessor’s 
determination that probable cause existed to charge the savings and 
loan.149 Although adverting to the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
harmless error doctrine,150 the court’s ruling rests principally on Legi-
Tech, in which, according to Doolin, the court “sustained the ratification 
despite misgivings about whether the new FEC had engaged in a ‘real 
fresh deliberation.’”151 The result in Legi-Tech followed a fortiori in 
Doolin, the latter opinion explains, because there was “no doubt” that the 
Office of Thrift Supervision’s permanent director had “made a detached 
 
for Appellant at 36–37, FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Nos. 94-5379, 95-5085) 
(citing Sullivan v. Carrick, 888 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that, in a First Amendment challenge 
to a disciplinary proceeding of state chiropractic board, the board could ratify an unauthorized notice 
of disciplinary hearing); Wirtz v. Atlantic States Const. Co., 357 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding 
that, in an action to recover minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act,  the decision to 
initiate such an action was delegable by the Secretary of Labor); Bowles v. Wheeler, 152 F.2d 34, 38–
41 (9th Cir. 1945) (holding that, in an action to recover treble damages under the Emergency Price 
Control Act,  the decision to initiate such an action was delegable by the head of the Office of Price 
Administration)). Thus, Legi-Tech’s appellate brief correctly observes that “the FEC has not cited a 
single case—because there is no such case—that supports the proposition that actions by an 
unconstitutional governmental agency can be insulated from challenge by the perfunctory ratification 
of a reconstituted governmental agency.” Brief for Respondent at 16, FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 
704 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Nos. 94-5379, 95-5085). 
 146. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 204 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 147. Id. at 211. 
 148. Id. at 213–14. 
 149. Id. at 213, 213 n.11. 
 150. Id. at 212; cf. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[T]he court shall review the whole record or those parts of 
it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”). 
 151. Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213 (quoting Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d at 709). As the Doolin opinion notes, 
the FEC “must engage in a lengthy, elaborate series of administrative steps involving investigation 
and deliberation before it votes to bring an enforcement action in court.” Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213 n.9. 
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and considered judgment in deciding the merits against the Bank.”152 In 
reaching that conclusion, the court in Doolin distinguished its decision 
from the Supreme Court’s ruling in NRA Political Victory Fund,153 which 
the court construed as imposing merely a timing limitation on the power 
to ratify.154 For that reason, NRA Political Victory Fund had no bearing on 
the plaintiff’s anti-ratification arguments, the D.C. Circuit explained, 
because at the time of the permanent director’s ratification, an initiation of 
the enforcement action still would have been timely.155 
Thus, with Legi-Tech and Doolin, we were already dangerously off 
course from a doctrinally sound application of the ratification doctrine. 
True, these cases concerned ratifications that were directed to 
administrative decisions of whether to initiate an enforcement action, and 
such determinations typically are not independently subject to judicial 
review.156 Thus, it might have been possible for later decisions to limit the 
rulings to contexts where a party’s arguments appear to thwart legislative 
 
 152. Id. at 213. As previously noted, the court concluded that such a determination necessarily 
operated as an (implied) affirmation of the original administrative complaint. See id. The court also 
suggested that Andrade v. Regnery reached a similar conclusion as to ratification. 824 F.2d 1253 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). But as discussed above, Andrade did not hold that a prior action had been ratified, but 
rather that the plaintiffs had not suffered a legally cognizable injury as a result of any action taken by 
an improperly appointed officer. Id. at 1257. 
 153. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994). 
 154. Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a somewhat broader (and in my 
view more accurate) interpretation of NRA Political Victory Fund. In Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau v. Seila Law, LLC on remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit upheld a ratification 
by the Bureau’s director over the objection that the director could not ratify acts taken by the Bureau 
prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
which held the director’s removal protections to be unconstitutional but also severable. Consumer Fin. 
Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law, LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020); Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. 
Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207–11 (2020). Were the Ninth Circuit in agreement with the D.C. Circuit 
over how to apply NRA Political Victory Fund, the Ninth Circuit could simply have overruled the 
objection on the ground that it did not concern a timing issue—something undoubtedly in the court’s 
mind because the defendant’s second objection was that the director’s ratification came outside of the 
applicable limitations period, an objection overruled on the ground that there was no applicable 
limitations period. Seila Law, 984 F.3d at 719–20. Instead, the Ninth Circuit entertained the NRA 
Political Victory Fund objection on the merits, ultimately however ruling for the agency based on a 
distinction between the power of the director to act (which prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling was 
limited) and the power of the agency itself, which the constitutional infirmity of the former never 
limited. See id. at 718–19; cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1) (authorizing “the Bureau” to issue civil 
investigative demands). 
 155. Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213 (“The timing problem posed in [NRA Political Victory Fund] is not 
present here. No statute of limitations would have barred Retsinas from reissuing the Notice of Charges 
himself and starting the administrative proceedings over again.”). 
 156. See FEC v. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“We must bear in mind that we 
have no statutory authority to review the FEC’s decision to sue . . . .”); cf. FTC v. Standard Oil. Co., 
449 U.S. 232, 239–47 (1980) (holding that issuance of an administrative complaint is not final agency 
action under the APA). 
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limitations on judicial review. But even if the D.C. Circuit had 
successfully done so, the ratification defense as it existed after Legi-Tech 
and Doolin would have been bad enough. Whether to bring an 
enforcement action is a decision that implicates a high degree of executive 
discretion or power.157 Hence, forcing a redo of the actions that were 
ratified in Legi-Tech and Doolin would have vindicated one of the 
Appointments Clause’s core purposes: preserving accountability for 
consequential executive action.158 In any event, the ratification defense 
would soon be expanded beyond agency enforcement matters. 
That expansion came with Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. Copyright Royalty Board.159 The plaintiff web broadcaster challenged 
the Copyright Royalty Board’s setting of webcasting royalty rates on the 
ground that the Board’s members served in violation of the Appointments 
Clause.160 The D.C. Circuit agreed,161 after which a properly reconstituted 
Board affirmed its prior decision without conducting a new hearing.162 The 
plaintiff objected that the Board’s action still violated the Appointments 
Clause because the newly constituted Board merely reviewed the prior 
proceeding’s record instead of conducting a new hearing; thus, the Board’s 
affirmation of its prior determination was, the plaintiff argued, “still 
tainted by the Appointments Clause violation that originally led this Court 
to remand.”163 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, concluding that, under Legi-
Tech and Doolin, the reconstituted Board did not need to restart the royalty 
 
 157. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on several 
occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil 
or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”). 
 158. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997) (“[T]he Appointments Clause was 
designed to ensure public accountability for both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection 
of a good one.”). 
 159. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 160. Id. at 115. 
 161. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336–41 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
 162. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d at 116–17. There is arguably some tension between 
the court’s entertaining of the challengers’ “taint” argument and Andrade. Andrade v. Regnery, 824 
F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Recall that, in the latter, the court held that the plaintiffs did not 
have cognizable injuries from the government’s planning of the reduction-in-force program but rather 
only from its approval, which was done by a properly appointed official. Id. One could also say that 
Intercollegiate suffered a cognizable injury only from the final rate determination, which was made 
by properly appointed officials, and thus that the court’s discussion of “taint” from a prior proceeding 
conducted in violation of the Appointments Clause was improper. Andrade, however, merely 
anticipates later decisions’ requirement of a detached and considered judgment in holding that it was 
enough that the qualified officer had “final authority over the implementation of the governmental 
action.” Id. 
 163. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 796 F.3d at 117. 
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determination process from step one;164 it was enough that the new Board 
had conducted an “independent evaluation of the merits.”165 The court also 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the ratification defense created by 
Legi-Tech and Doolin was limited to the specific type of administrative 
actions at issue in those cases.166 
Thus, some sixteen years or so after Legi-Tech, the D.C. Circuit had 
firmly established the rule that an administrative process (whether 
enforcement or adjudicatory) infected at some point by an Appointments 
Clause violation need not be restarted from that point if a properly 
appointed official ratifies the action taken by an improperly appointed 
predecessor.167 But what of a “self-ratification”? That is, can the 
“independent evaluation of the merits”168 and “detached and considered 
judgment”169 standards be satisfied when the person ratifying is the same 
person who took the prior action in violation of the Appointments Clause? 
“Yes,” the D.C. Circuit concluded in its 2017 decision of Wilkes-
Barre Hospital Company, LLC v. NLRB.170 At issue was a determination 
by the National Labor Relations Board that the petitioner hospital had 
violated the National Labor Relations Act.171 The hospital challenged the 
determination, in part, under the Appointments Clause, citing the Supreme 
Court’s then recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning172 holding that a 
majority of the Board members’ appointments were invalid recess 
appointments.173 After Noel Canning, a Board re-composed of properly 
appointed members voted to affirm all of its prior determinations, 
including the appointment of the regional director who had initiated the 
administrative action against the hospital.174 That official in turn ratified 
all of his prior determinations.175 The hospital contested these ratifications, 
but was rebuffed by the D.C. Circuit. Quoting from Intercollegiate and 
Doolin, the court reasoned that the “[h]ospital presents no evidence to 
 
 164. Id. at 118–19. 
 165. Id. at 117. 
 166. Id. at 119 (“Intercollegiate also seeks to distinguish both Legi-Tech and Doolin on the 
ground that they involved administrative enforcement actions—‘an area of traditionally broad 
discretion’—rather than the exercise of judicial authority in an adversarial proceeding. . . . But neither 
Legi-Tech nor Doolin rested its holding on that ground.”). 
 167. See id. at 117–21. 
 168. Id. at 117. 
 169. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 214 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 170. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 171. Id. at 367. 
 172. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014). 
 173. Id. at 556. 
 174. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., 857 F.3d at 371. 
 175. Id. 
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suggest that the Board failed ‘to conduct an independent evaluation of the 
merits,’ or make ‘a detached and considered judgment,’ when it ratified 
[the regional director’s] appointment.”176 Reaching the same conclusion 
with respect to the regional director’s self-ratification, the court explained, 
this time quoting from Legi-Tech and Doolin, that “the [h]ospital presented 
no evidence suggesting that [the regional director] failed to make a 
detached and considered judgment or that he was ‘actually biased’ against 
the [h]ospital.”177 Moreover, “forcing [the regional director] to reissue the 
complaint in this case would likely ‘do nothing but give the [hospital] the 
benefit of delay.’”178 The court acknowledged that the regional director’s 
self-ratification “presents a more difficult question” than the Board’s 
because the former acted as “both the principal and the agent,”179 while the 
reconstituted Board was composed of different personnel. But the court 
then noted that it had flagged a similar issue in Doolin and Legi-Tech and 
yet had still affirmed the ratifications there at issue.180 The court’s remedial 
hands were tied: at most, the hospital could force the administrative 
process to return to step one, but only with the same regional director. The 
hospital could not absolutely prevent the regional director from re-
initiating an enforcement action, and forcing him to do so would “not 
necessarily promise a ‘more detached’ and ‘pure’ consideration of the 
merits of the case.”181 
Let us pause now again to assess. With Legi-Tech and Doolin, the 
D.C. Circuit begot the ratification defense. With Intercollegiate, the court 
made clear that the defense would be available to remedy not just defects 
 
 176. Id. (first quoting Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 
117 (D.C. Cir. 2015); and then Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 
203, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 177. Id. at 372. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. It was not, however, precisely the same issue. In neither Legi-Tech, nor Doolin, nor 
Intercollegiate were the ratifiers responsible for the Appointments Clause violation: in Legi-Tech, the 
violation was caused by the presence of the congressional ex officio appointees, whom the FEC 
excluded when it voted to ratify its past actions; in Doolin, the acting, not the permanent, director was 
responsible for the alleged violation; and in Intercollegiate, the rate-making decision after remand was 
made by a fresh panel of properly appointed copyright judges. Hence, Wilkes-Barre was the D.C. 
Circuit’s first decision upholding a ratification of an action for which the principal himself was 
responsible. The opinion in Wilkes-Barre notwithstanding, it is not implausible that there may be some 
material difference in the degree of authentic reconsideration between a principal who is ordered to 
do the act himself that was originally done by his agent, and a principal who is ordered to merely redo 
the act that was originally done by himself. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting FEC v. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d 704, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The Third Circuit, 
following Doolin and Legi-Tech, reached the same result. Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 
820 F.3d 592, 602–06 (3d Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit as well has upheld a self-ratification without 
do-over. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1192 (9th Cir. 2016). 
2021] Neither Safe, Nor Legal, Nor Rare 797 
 
in agency enforcement actions but also agency adjudications.182 Then with 
Wilkes-Barre Hospital, the court extended the defense further to include 
self-ratifications where even the pretense of a principal–agent relationship 
could not be maintained.183 What, you may well ask, was left that the 
ratification defense had not yet claimed? 
Two years later, Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives184 presented an as yet unaddressed scenario for the 
operation of a ratification defense to an Appointments Clause challenge. 
The plaintiff gun owners brought a pre-enforcement challenge to a Bureau 
rule classifying their weapons as machineguns.185 They argued that the 
rule was invalid because, among other reasons, the Acting Attorney 
General lacked authority under the Appointments Clause to promulgate 
the rule.186 While the case was pending, a duly appointed Attorney General 
ratified the rule.187 The challengers accepted the validity of the ratification 
but argued that the court should still address the merits of the 
Appointments Clause challenge under either of two exceptions to 
mootness.188 The D.C. Circuit declined, concluding that the Attorney 
General’s ratification operated as a resolution of the Appointments Clause 
claim on the merits rather than a mooting of the same.189 
Finally, we come to the circuit’s most recent discussion of 
ratification—Moose Jooce v. FDA.190 This case gave the court an 
opportunity to address what had escaped review in Guedes, namely, an 
Appointments Clause pre-enforcement challenge to an agency rule. A 
collection of vaping shops challenged the FDA’s so-called Deeming 
Rule,191 which subjects vaping products to the substantial regulatory 
strictures of the Tobacco Control Act.192 FDA had determined that 
exempting vaping products from Tobacco Control Act regulation posed a 
 
 182. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
 183. See Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., 857 F.3d at 372. 
 184. Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
 185. Id. at 6. The rule was later enjoined by the Sixth Circuit. Gun Owners of Am. v. Garland, 
992 F.3d 446, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2021). 
 186. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 9. 
 187. Id. at 10. 
 188. Id. at 12. 
 189. Id. at 13. The court also went on to observe that, even if the ratification’s effect should be 
understood through mootness, the court would still decline to address the Appointments Clause claim 
because neither of the plaintiffs’ proffered mootness exceptions applied. Id. at 14–16. 
 190. Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2854 (2021). 
 191. Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 28,976, 28,979 (May 10, 2016) (amending portions of 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, 1143). 
 192. 21 U.S.C. §§ 387–387(u). 
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danger to public health193 and, therefore, those products should be subject 
to the Tobacco Control Act’s provisions, including requiring pre-
marketing approval of most covered products as well as pre-approval of 
certain types of product advertising.194 The plaintiffs’ lead claim was that 
the Deeming Rule violates the Appointments Clause because it was issued 
by the FDA’s Associate Commissioner for Policy, a career civil service 
position.195 About eighteen months after the litigation had commenced, 
then FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb purported to ratify the Deeming 
Rule.196 The plaintiffs argued that Commissioner Gottlieb’s ratification 
was invalid because (1) it had come only after suit had been filed and thus 
would have the effect of depriving the plaintiffs of their cause of action 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) it did not comport 
with the APA’s requirements for reasoned decision-making.197 On the 
latter point, the plaintiffs argued that the Gottlieb ratification was invalid 
because it deliberately ignored a substantial body of material pertaining to 
the health effects of vaping, which had been produced since the Deeming 
Rule’s issuance in 2016.198 The ratification’s failure to consider the recent 
health research therefore violated the fundamental APA principle that 
agencies must consider all available and relevant evidence and must 
explain why their decisions are reasonable in light of that evidence.199 
In upholding the Gottlieb ratification, the D.C. Circuit concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ attacks were precluded by circuit precedent.200 As to the 
plaintiffs’ first objection, the court ruled that its decision in Legi-Tech was 
apposite; there the court upheld a ratification that had occurred only after 
the plaintiff had raised its Appointments Clause objection in litigation.201 
As to the second objection, the court cited Intercollegiate, Doolin, and 
Legi-Tech for the proposition that the only limitations on a government 
principal’s power to ratify are that the principal conduct an unbiased and 
independent evaluation of the merits using a detached and considered 
 
 193. See Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
81 Fed. Reg. at 28,975. 
 194. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 387j(a)(2), 387k(b)(2)(A). 
 195. Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 28. 
 196. FDA also relied, successfully in the district court, upon a blanket and boilerplate ratification 
issued by former FDA Commissioner Robert Califf. See Moose Jooce v. FDA, No. 18-cv-203 (CRC), 
2020 WL 680143, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2020). The D.C. Circuit, however, declined to address 
whether such a boilerplate affirmation would satisfy the standards articulated in Legi-Tech, Doolin, 
and Intercollegiate, given the court’s decision to uphold the Gottlieb ratification under those standards. 
See Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 29. 
 197. Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 28–30. 
 198. Id. at 29. 
 199. See id. (discussing Butte County v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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judgment—in other words, the normal rules of administrative procedure 
just do not apply.202 
C. Ratification as Resolution of the Merits of an Appointments Clause 
Claim203 
Thanks to Legi-Tech, Doolin, Intercollegiate, Wilkes-Barre, and 
Moose Jooce, agencies litigating in the D.C. Circuit have a powerful 
defense to avoid litigation of Appointments Clause challenges. What has 
made the ratification defense a nearly insuperable bar to reaching the 
merits in such litigation is how the D.C. Circuit has characterized the 
jurisprudential effect of the defense’s successful employment. 
As Guedes illustrates, when a government official lawfully ratifies 
an action, the D.C. Circuit considers the consequences of the official’s act 
to be a resolution of the merits of any challenge to that agency action: “We 
have repeatedly held that a properly appointed official’s ratification of an 
allegedly improper official’s prior action, rather than mooting a claim, 
resolves the claim on the merits by ‘remedy[ing] [the] defect’ (if any) from 
the initial appointment.”204 That is so regardless of whether the 
Appointments Clause objection is raised in a defensive posture or as part 
of a pre-enforcement challenge to agency action.205 The court has defended 
this rule by analogizing to cases where agency action was challenged 
because it had not been preceded by notice and comment, but the action 
was nevertheless upheld because the agency instituted a post-action 
comment period.206 
Although perhaps superficially convincing, the D.C. Circuit’s 
categorical merits-not-mootness rule falls apart under closer scrutiny. 
Take the Moose Jooce litigation as an example. As discussed above, the 
plaintiffs had brought a pre-enforcement challenge to a regulation 
allegedly issued in violation of the Appointments Clause.207 After the 
regulation had been challenged, a properly appointed official ratified the 
rule, and the D.C. Circuit concluded that this ratification “cured any 
 
 202. See id. at 29–30. 
 203. One circuit court has, without elaboration, described ratification of an alleged 
Appointments Clause violation as “an equitable remedy.” Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 
820 F.3d 592, 603 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 204. Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (quoting Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 
 205. See Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 30. 
 206. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 13. The analogy appears to be overdrawn. In the one case, what one 
has sued for—notice and comment—has been provided. In the other case, what one has demanded—
proper promulgation of a rule—has not happened because, although ratification may legitimize an 
otherwise invalid action, it is not a redo of that action. 
 207. Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 28–29. 
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potential Appointments Clause defect,” thereby “resolv[ing] the claim on 
the merits.”208 But despite the court’s declaration, the purported 
ratification did not really resolve the alleged violation. The old rule issued 
by an officer serving in violation of the Appointments Clause still exists 
as originally promulgated, and the decision-making process that  
resulted in its issuance has never been conducted by a constitutional 
officer. Possibly one could argue that the Moose Jooce plaintiffs  
were no longer harmed by the rule once it had been ratified, but that point 
sounds much more like an argument for mootness than for a  
defense on the merits.209 Yet the D.C. Circuit has shown no interest in 
carving out any exception to its understanding of ratification’s effect on 
an Appointments Clause challenge.210 
Ultimately, however compelling (or not) the D.C. Circuit’s 
characterization of the ratification defense’s impact is, its thwarting of the 
development of Appointments Clause case law cannot be doubted. So long 
as an agency ratifies at any point prior to final judgment, the agency can 
prevent the courts from addressing what may be flagrant and repeated 
violations of a key support for the separation of powers.211 In the next 
section, I argue that, for this and other reasons, the D.C. Circuit’s 
ratification doctrine should be discarded. 
 
 208. Id. at 30 (quoting Guedes, 920 F.3d at 13). 
 209. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A party’s case or 
controversy becomes moot either when the injury is healed and only prospective relief has been sought 
or when it becomes impossible for the courts, through the exercise of their remedial powers, to do 
anything to redress the injury.”). 
 210. E.g., Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 30. The court has, however, recognized “a narrow exception 
to ratification’s curative effect for Appointments Clause challenges to the acts of ‘purely decision 
recommending employees,’” on the ground that the constitutionality of such acts would “escape 
judicial review” without such an exception. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 13 (quoting Landry v. FDIC, 204 
F.3d 1125, 1131–32 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). That explanation is strikingly similar to the rationale underlying 
the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 564 
U.S. 431, 439–40 (2011) (explaining that a case is not moot “if (1) the challenged action is in its 
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable 
expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again” (quoting 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975))). 
 211. This under-enforcement and law-development-impediment dynamic is not unlike what the 
doctrine of qualified immunity has produced. See generally Project on Immunity and Accountability, 
INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/issues/project-on-immunity-and-accountability/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9WW-JSPA]. 
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V. WHY THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S RATIFICATION DEFENSE SHOULD BE 
ABANDONED—OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, SUBSTANTIALLY 
CIRCUMSCRIBED 
We have now reviewed the common law of ratification, its 
employment in the Supreme Court, and its unwarranted application to 
Appointments Clause challenges by the D.C. Circuit. This section explains 
why the D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense is irreconcilable with NRA 
Political Victory Fund, which is the best guidance we have  
from the Supreme Court on how to use ratification in disputes concerning 
official action. This section also demonstrates that the ratification defense 
cannot be squared with the common law of ratification or  
with an appropriately vigorous enforcement of the doctrine of separation 
of powers, and that the ratification defense inhibits the ordered judicial 
development of that doctrine. 
A. The Ratification Defense Cannot be Reconciled with NRA Political 
Victory Fund 
The Supreme Court has cited NRA Political Victory Fund in only a 
handful of decisions.212 Moreover, despite the Supreme Court’s growing 
Appointments Clause docket, no decision has yet addressed how the 
common law doctrine of ratification should operate—if at all—in 
Appointments Clause challenges.213 Thus, in assessing the propriety of the 
D.C. Circuit’s ratification doctrine, our best guidance is NRA Political 
Victory Fund, amplified by the common law of ratification upon which it 
relies. How does the D.C. Circuit’s rule stack up? 
Not very well. Perhaps its biggest flaw is the ratification defense’s 
watering down of NRA Political Victory Fund’s incorporation of a key 
limitation at common law on the power of the principal to ratify—namely, 
that the principal must have the power to take the action in question both 
originally and at the time of ratification.214 Recall that the Supreme Court 
in NRA Political Victory Fund rejected an attempted ratification because 
 
 212. Rather, subsequent cases have relied on its holding that the time period for filing a petition 
for writ of certiorari in a civil case is jurisdictional, Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007), and 
that decisions that do not discuss jurisdiction are not precedent for the existence of jurisdiction, Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998). 
 213. As noted above, supra note 94, the Court in Seila Law and Lucia adverted to ratification 
but in neither opinion did the Court address whether it may be applied to constitutional claims. 
 214. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 98 (1994). The logic of the D.C. Circuit’s 
narrowing of NRA Political Victory Fund may ultimately render that decision a dead letter. See 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2021 WL 134618, at *11–15 (M.D. 
Pa. Jan. 13, 2021) (using the doctrine of equitable tolling to overrule a statute-of-limitations objection 
to an agency’s ratification). 
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the purported principal (the Solicitor General) no longer had, at the time 
of ratification, the power to take the action to be ratified in the first 
instance: “His authorization simply came too late in the day to be 
effective.”215 As we have seen, the D.C. Circuit has construed this 
limitation on ratification as purely a timing problem like that presented by 
a statute of limitations.216 Hence, in the absence of any such timing 
problem, a ratification should be upheld, per the D.C. Circuit, so long as it 
is the result of an “independent evaluation of the merits”217 and a 
“detached and considered judgment”218 based upon “full knowledge of the 
decision to be ratified.”219 Accordingly, all of the otherwise normally 
applicable procedural and substantive limitations governing agency 
action—not just small points like signature of a rule by the appropriate 
agency decision-maker,220 but also really significant limitations, like the 
obligation to take into account all relevant evidence and to explain how 
the decision reached is justified by that evidence221—are irrelevant. The 
D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense thus effectively eliminates what one 
might describe as NRA Political Victory Fund’s “power” proviso—a 
principal may ratify that which the principal could have done at the time 
the agent attempted to, provided that the principal still has the power when 
ratifying to do the original act.222 
It is no answer to this critique of the ratification defense that agency 
officials in their public acts should be governed by different principles than 
those common law rules that govern private actors:223 the ratification at 
issue in NRA Political Victory Fund concerned the acts of government 
officials, yet that aspect of the case did not stop the Supreme Court from 
 
 215. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. at 98. 
 216. See, e.g., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 213 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 820 F.3d 592, 603–04 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 217. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 117 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
 218. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, 139 F.3d at 213. 
 219. Advanced Disposal, 820 F.3d at 602. 
 220. See, e.g., Huntco Pawn Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 240 F. Supp. 3d 206, 232 
(D.D.C. 2016); Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 46 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 221. See, e.g., Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 222. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 98 (1994) (“[I]t is essential that the party 
ratifying should be able not merely to do the act ratified at the time the act was done, but also at the 
time the ratification was made.” (quoting Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S. 332, 338 (1874))). 
 223. See NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. at 98 (discussing the issue of whether the Solicitor 
General could ratify the FEC’s filing and concluding that it was “at least presumptively governed by 
principles of agency law, and in particular the doctrine of ratification”). Contra Alfa Int’l Seafood, 264 
F. Supp. 3d at 44 (“The question in this case does not, however, arise under ‘the law of 
agency’ . . . . Instead, the question presented is one of administrative law . . . .”). 
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applying the common law rules and limitations of ratification.224 
Moreover, nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision indicates that the 
Court viewed the defect in the Solicitor General’s attempted ratification as 
necessarily about timing.225 Rather, the Court’s inquiry was focused on 
authority; it just so happened that the Solicitor General’s lack of authority 
was a function of the passage of time. 
Perhaps the D.C. Circuit has been comfortable with weakening NRA 
Political Victory Fund’s power proviso because the concerns of Congress 
and the courts about arbitrary decision-making which underlie modern 
administrative law,226 but which are expressly ignored when adjudicating 
the adequacy of an official’s ratification, are impliedly considered by the 
“independent evaluation” and “detached and considered judgment” 
requirements of the ratification defense. Yet those standards are no real 
substitute in practice for the demands of the APA and other laws that 
ensure that government decision-making is public, rational, and 
competently explained.227 The decision in Moose Jooce is a fine  
example of this shortchanging of the APA as applied to the common law 
rule that a principal’s ratification must be subject to the same constraints 
as the agent’s original act. Recall that, in Moose Jooce, the D.C. Circuit 
held that “the proposition that administrative officials must consider new 
evidence in order to make non-arbitrary, reasoned decisions”  
did not apply to the FDA Commissioner’s ratification of the Deeming Rule 
because the ratification was issued after the original rule-making process 
had been completed and thus by definition was not subject to the 
procedures governing that process.228 In other words, an important 
component of the obligation of reasoned decision-making229 does not 
 
 224. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. at 98–99. 
 225. See id. 
 226. See Dep’t of Comm. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2575–76 (2019) (“The reasoned 
explanation requirement of administrative law, after all, is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine 
justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested 
public. Accepting contrived reasons would defeat the purpose of the enterprise.”). 
 227. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 
action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))). 
 228. Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 29 (“Here, the rulemaking record closed in 2016 and 
consequently Commissioner Gottlieb had no such obligation to consider new evidence in 2019. 
Therefore, it was not arbitrary and capricious for him to ratify the Deeming Rule without considering 
the new evidence that appellants reference.”). 
 229. See, e.g., Butte County v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A]n agency’s 
refusal to consider evidence bearing on the issue before it constitutes arbitrary agency action . . . .”). 
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apply to the issue of whether to promulgate an industry-wrecking rule230 
so long as that decision comes in the form of a ratification rather than an 
initial approval. Thus, as the Moose Jooce decision illustrates,  
to allow the D.C. Circuit’s standards for ratification to substitute for those 
established in the APA and other law inevitably undercuts safeguards 
against arbitrary administrative power.231 
Even apart from NRA Political Victory Fund, Supreme Court case 
law strongly supports treating certain limitations on an official’s power to 
act in the first instance as relevant to determining whether the official’s 
attempt to ratify another’s act is valid. This issue arose frequently in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century when the Court had quite a few cases 
regarding local governments’ attempts to avoid paying on municipal 
bonds (typically issued to attract railroads to town). The usual defense 
advanced by the local governments was to point to some purported defect 
in the bonds’ issuance.232 A representative discussion can be found in 
Marsh v. Fulton County.233 There, the plaintiff bondholders sued the 
County to collect on bonds that the latter had issued.234 The County 
resisted in part on the ground that the County Clerk had illegally sold the 
bonds because the County’s electorate did not have an opportunity to 
approve their sale. The bondholders replied that, even if such a vote had 
been required originally, the bonds were ratified by subsequent actions of 
the County’s board of supervisors treating the bonds as legal.235 In ruling 
for the County, the Supreme Court explained not only that a vote was 
required for the bonds to be legal, but that, precisely because such a vote 
was required, the County’s purported ratification without such a vote was 
void.236 The County’s board of supervisors “could not, therefore, ratify a 
subscription without a vote of the county, because they could not make a 
 
 230. See, e.g., Lauren H. Greenberg, Note, The “Deeming Rule”: The FDA’s Destruction of the 
Vaping Industry, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 779 (2018) (“The high fees and burdensome regulatory 
scheme threaten to put small, previously booming businesses and vapor shops out of business for 
good.”). 
 231. See AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 471 F. Supp. 3d 228, 238 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[I]n the APA, Congress 
fashioned a statutory cause of action, and a remedy, for the longstanding legal claim that the agency-
defendant had unlawfully made the challenged policy determination in an ‘arbitrary [or] capricious’ 
fashion.” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))). 
 232. E.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Beal, 113 U.S. 227 (1885); Daviess County v. Huidekoper, 
98 U.S. 98 (1878); Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874); Bd. 
of Supervisors v. Schenck, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 772 (1866); Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 65 U.S. (24 
How.) 287 (1860). 
 233. Marsh v. Fulton County, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 676 (1870). 
 234. See id. at 681. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 682–83. 
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subscription in the first instance without such authorization.”237 As with 
municipal bonds, so with agency action: an officer may have the power to 
issue a rule or an adjudication, but that power is circumscribed by the 
APA. Thus, if the officer’s ratification of an otherwise APA-defective 
rulemaking or adjudication would not itself satisfy the APA as a stand-
alone action, then it follows that the officer’s ratification cannot ratify the 
deficient action of the officer’s agent. It is just as in Marsh. The County 
there undoubtedly had the power to issue the bonds, but only after going 
through the procedure of a vote of its electorate. 
Another way in which the D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense goes 
awry under NRA Political Victory Fund is its misunderstanding of the 
relevant frame of analysis. The decision in Moose Jooce again presents a 
good example. There, the D.C. Circuit affirmed an FDA Commissioner’s 
ratification of a rule issued by a subordinate FDA employee three years 
earlier.238 The court found no NRA Political Victory Fund problem in the 
fact that the ratification was expressly limited to the material contained in 
the 2016 record and thus that the ratification deliberately ignored post-
2016 evidence bearing directly on the rule.239 The court acknowledged the 
general APA principle that “administrative officials must consider new 
evidence in order to make non-arbitrary, reasoned decisions.”240 But the 
court considered that principle inapplicable to the dispute before it because 
“the rulemaking record closed in 2016 and consequently Commissioner 
Gottlieb had no such obligation to consider new evidence in 2019.”241 The 
trouble with the court’s analysis is that it begs the question of whether the 
2016 decision was proper. That is, the only reason why the record could 
 
 237. Id. at 684; accord Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 451–52 (1886). But in a number 
of cases, the Court was willing to overlook certain procedural irregularities in the municipality’s 
original transaction, such as whether proper notice of a qualifying election had been provided. Beal, 
113 U.S. at 237–40. The rationale was not, however, that the local government had effected a valid 
ratification despite the alleged prior procedural irregularity, but rather that the local government was 
now estopped from relying upon the prior irregularity to avoid paying on the bonds, id. at 240. See 
Board of Supervisors v. Schenk, 72 U.S. at 781–85, for an example of the admixture of ratification and 
estoppel. But, just as with ratification, where there was clearly no authority to begin with, there also 
could be no estoppel. Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 87 U.S. at 667; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 103  (“A person may be estopped to deny that he has ratified an act or transaction.”); cf. 
Bissell, 65 U.S. at 298–300 (factual predicate necessary to the power to ratify issuance of bonds cannot 
be attacked once the bonds have been issued and acquired by bona fide purchasers). See generally 
Daviess County, 98 U.S. at 101 (“There is no difficulty in appreciating the distinction stated; and we 
are now to ascertain whether the error we are considering, assuming it to be one, arises from an 
irregularity in the exercise of an existing power, or whether there is total want of authority to act.”). 
 238. See Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26, 28–30 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
 239. See id. at 28–29. 
 240. Id. at 29. 
 241. Id. 
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be closed in 2016 would be if the 2016 rule issuance were proper. But the 
whole point of ratification is to rectify an otherwise invalid action. As one 
prominent treatise explains, “ratification is not a form of authorization” 
but is rather “a cure for the lack of authorization, or a substitute for 
authorization,” for it “presupposes that there was no authority; and there 
can, in the nature of the case, be no authority to do an act given after the 
act is done.”242 Hence, to determine whether a ratification is effective, one 
must assume that the prior act is not valid and therefore is in need of some 
additional authorization in order to be validated. Again, in NRA Political 
Victory Fund, the Supreme Court did not apply a loosened standard for 
what constituted a timely cert petition. Rather, the Court addressed the 
question of the timeliness of the FEC’s cert petition on the assumption that 
it had not actually been filed when originally submitted, and only then did 
the Court inquire as to whether the Solicitor General’s authorization of that 
petition was timely according to the standard measure of timeliness.243 Just 
so, in Moose Jooce, this principle should have led the D.C. Circuit to 
review the FDA Commissioner’s attempted ratification on the assumption 
that the 2016 rule had never been issued and, thus, that the rulemaking 
record had not closed.244 
B. The Ratification Defense Cannot be Reconciled with Traditional 
Ratification Principles 
The preceding section245 described how the D.C. Circuit’s 
ratification defense runs afoul of NRA Political Victory Fund in at least 
two ways: (1) the defense improperly limits that decision to questions 
about a purported ratification’s timeliness, and (2) the defense illogically 
adjudges the validity of a purported ratification while also assuming that 
the portion of the act to be ratified is already valid. But the faults of the 
D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense run far deeper than a conflict with 
Supreme Court precedent. The defense cannot be squared with four basic 
principles undergirding the common law doctrine of ratification: (1) a 
valid principal-agent relationship must exist; (2) the agent must purport to 
act on behalf of a principal; (3) the principal must have the power to do 
the original act at the time of ratification and the power must be exercised 
 
 242. MECHEM, supra note 52, § 348, at 261. 
 243. FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 98 (1994). 
 244. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The ‘whole’ 
administrative record, therefore, consists of all documents and materials directly or indirectly 
considered by agency decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the agency’s position.”). 
 245. See supra Section V.A. 
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consistent with the limitations that applied to the agent’s act; and (4) no 
third-party rights may be disturbed. 
First, ratification is a species of agency law, and thus presupposes 
that the act to be ratified is one not only that the principal could have done 
in the first instance, but also one that the principal could have authorized 
an agent to do on the principal’s behalf.246 Yet, in Appointments Clause 
challenges, the argument is always that the governmental agent was 
constitutionally incapable of doing the act, and thus that the governmental 
principal was constitutionally incapable of delegating to that agent the 
power that would otherwise enable a ratification.247 Hence, because the 
lawfulness of the principal-agent relationship is directly challenged in an 
Appointments Clause case, a necessary predicate for ratification’s 
operation will always be absent.248 Put another way, either there is an 
Appointments Clause violation, in which case there is no valid principal-
agent relationship that can sustain a ratification, or there is no 
Appointments Clause violation, in which case ratification is irrelevant. 
A second reason why ratification is generally a poor fit in 
Appointments Clause cases derives from the traditional common law rule 
that ratification operates only when the agent, whose acts are to be ratified, 
purported to act for a principal.249 Thus, although a ratification defense 
may in this regard be plausible as against a challenge to an official’s 
authority to act with power that is expressly exercised in someone else’s 
name,250 it is a very poor fit when that official is attempting to exercise 
 
 246. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 84 cmt. a  (“If . . . one can create a power in 
another to affect his rights by doing an act on his account, and such an act is purported to be done on 
his account by the other, or, if an act of service is intended to be done on his account, the act is 
ratifiable.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(3) (“If performance of an act is not delegable, 
its performance by an agent does not constitute performance by the principal.”). 
 247. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–51 (2018). 
 248. Perhaps that might not be so in cases of so-called self-ratification, where a properly 
appointed government officer seeks to ratify acts that the officer took prior to appointment. A self-
ratification would, however, likely fail on other grounds, such as the lack of a plausible principal-agent 
relationship. 
 249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 85(1); see Cent. Nat’l Bank v. Royal Ins. Co., 103 
U.S. 783, 786 (1880) (“There is here no question of ratification. This can only arise where the 
borrowing is by the agent for the company without authority, and the company adopts by its acts what 
was done by the agent. Here the borrowing was by the agent for himself and not the company.”). 
 250. This happens to be the precise scenario in the cases that the government relied upon in the 
initial D.C. Circuit decisions that gave birth to the Appointments Clause ratification defense, viz., a 
statute grants Official X the power to do something, but X instead delegates to Subordinate Y, who in 
turn exercises that power against Citizen A, who in turn objects on the ground that Y has no statutory 
authority to do so—only X does—but then A’s objection is overruled when X ratifies Y’s act. See, 
e.g., Wirtz v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 357 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that the decision to 
initiate an action to recover minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act was delegable by the 
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authority in the official’s own name.251 Yet, in many Appointments Clause 
cases, the government “agents” were indeed acting for themselves, the 
trouble of course being that they did not have the constitutional authority 
so to act252—for example, the members of the NLRB in Wilkes-Barre 
Hospital or the commissioners of the FEC in Legi-Tech.253 One might 
counter that, if “the United States government” is viewed as the principal 
and all of its officers as agents thereof, then there is no problem with a 
ratification by a properly deputized agent.254 But this would be a strained 
way of interpreting how most federal action is understood to operate. Each 
federal office has certain powers attached to it, which under the 
Appointments Clause may be exercised by a person properly appointed to 
hold that office. Those powers, although ultimately derived from “the 
People,” nevertheless still pertain to that office and are properly exercised 
by the occupant of that office.255 This presumably explains why, in none 
 
Secretary of Labor); Bowles v. Wheeler, 152 F.2d 34, 38–41 (9th Cir. 1945) (holding that, in an action 
to recover treble damages under the Emergency Price Control Act, the decision to initiate such an 
action was delegable by the head of the Office of Price Administration). 
 251. Even setting aside the problem of the absence of a true principal-agent relationship, there is 
still the problem of capacity. A principal generally cannot ratify an agent’s act if the act was done at a 
time when the principal lacked the power to do the act directly. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 84(2) (“An act which, when done, the purported or intended principal could not have 
authorized, he cannot ratify, except an act affirmed by a legal representative whose appointment relates 
back to or before the time of such act.”). 
 252. Perhaps an exception exists when a person is serving as an “acting” officer under the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act, in which case one might plausibly characterize the “acting” official as the 
agent for the as-yet not qualified permanent official. Notably, Congress has expressly allowed for 
some ratification of improper actions taken by “acting” officials. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3348(e)(1)–(5). 
Congress has also implicitly recognized the general power of the President to ratify subordinates’ 
actions. See 3 U.S.C. § 301. 
 253. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co. v. NLRB, 857 F.3d 364, 370 (D.C. Cir. 2017); FEC v. Legi-Tech, 
Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 254. The opinion in Doolin suggests this. See Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift 
Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“On the other hand, the situation in this case is not 
easily characterized as between a principal—Retsinas—and an agent—Fiechter. They were never even 
at OTS together. Fiechter and Retsinas might both be viewed as agents of the United States.”); cf. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 93(3) (“The affirmance can be made by an agent authorized 
to do so.”). 
 255. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174–76 (1994) (holding that military officers do 
not need a new appointment to serve as military judges because the duties of the latter are “germane” 
to those of the former). One might also object on this basis to employing ratification for actions taken 
pursuant to internal agency delegations of authority, although the objection could arguably be resolved 
if the delegate were to expressly state that the power being exercised is on behalf of a higher official. 
This, however, is rarely the case. See, for example, Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2020), 
in which the Deeming Rule was published in the Federal Register as having been issued by the 
Associate Commissioner for Policy in her own name, 81 Fed. Reg. at 29,106, even though her action 
was pursuant to authority delegated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Brief for 
Appellees, at 7–8, Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Nos. 20-5049, 20-5048, 20-
5050). 
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of the D.C. Circuit cases that we have reviewed, the supposed 
governmental agents purported to act on behalf of any office other than 
the ones that the agents thought they lawfully occupied. 
A third common law requirement for ratification, which we have 
seen at play in NRA Political Victory Fund and Marsh, is that the principal 
must have the power to authorize the transaction at the time of affirmance 
and that the principal must exercise that power according to the same 
formalities that would have governed the agent’s action.256 Yet, at least as 
ratification is usually employed in Appointments Clause cases, the 
principal is not subjected to the normal substantive or procedural 
constraints on the exercise of power.257 
And finally, ratification is not typically allowed if it would deprive a 
party of rights or a cause of action that has already accrued.258 For most 
litigation concerning federal administrative action, a party has a cause of 
action for redress if the party has suffered “legal wrong” or has been 
“adversely affected or aggrieved” by agency action.259 Thus, for example, 
once a regulation has been issued allegedly in violation of the 
 
 256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 86(1), 93(2). As noted above, the Third 
Restatement has eased the standard somewhat: now it is only necessary for a ratifier to have power at 
the time of ratification. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.04(1). The change is not particularly 
relevant here, however, because all of the major Appointments Clause ratification cases concern 
instances where the principal undoubtedly had the power to ratify at the time of ratification, the 
question being whether the ratification was ineffective because, for example, it was not exercised in 
accord with the same substantive and procedural rules that normally govern the action being ratified. 
Some complications can arise where the principal and agent are the same person. For example, in 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016), the director of the 
CFPB initiated many enforcement actions between the time that he was improperly recess-appointed 
and properly appointed. Id. at 1186. Although the panel majority saw no problem with the director’s 
ratification of his own decisions to bring enforcement actions, id. at 1188–90, dissenting Judge Ikuta 
did, id. at 1200–01. In her view, the absence of a validly appointed enforcement officer meant that the 
agency had no basis to invoke the President’s Take Care Clause power, and thus could not satisfy 
Article III standing. Id. at 1199–1203 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). That in turn meant that the agency’s 
enforcement action had to be dismissed because standing must exist when an action is initiated. See 
id. at 1203 (citing, inter alia, FEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 90, 98–99 (1994)). 
 257. See, e.g., Moose Jooce, 981 F.3d at 29; Huntco Pawn Holdings, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
240 F. Supp. 3d 206, 232 (D.D.C. 2016); Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 46 (D.D.C. 
2017). 
 258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 90; see id. rep. note (“Coming within the rule, also, 
are cases in which an attempt has been made, after action has been begun, to ratify an act which was 
a prerequisite to the suit.”); see, e.g., Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 255 (Ariz. 1986) 
(prohibiting ratification of otherwise wrongful discharge because discharged employee had 
commenced suit prior to ratification). The Second Restatement concedes that this litigation cut-off 
rule for ratification “has not always been recognized and has been severely criticized,” but it concludes 
that “the current of judicial opinion is with the rule as stated herein.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 90 rep. note. 
 259. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Such a cause of action may be provided by the APA, equity, or the 
Constitution directly. See Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 188–90 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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Appointments Clause, and the regulation injures a person, the injured party 
is vested with a right to judicial review of that regulation260 to determine 
whether, among other things, the rule is “contrary to constitutional right, 
power, privilege, or immunity.”261 The same conclusion should apply in 
enforcement actions as well, to the extent that the Appointments Clause 
violation operates as an affirmative defense.262 Yet the D.C. Circuit’s 
ratification defense often deprives litigants of their right of judicial review 
and an opportunity for the courts to adjudicate whether a constitutional 
violation has occurred. 
C. The Ratification Defense Inhibits the Enforcement of the Separation of 
Powers 
Besides its inconsistency with Supreme Court precedent and 
traditional common law rules, the ratification defense is ill-conceived 
because it gives agency officials virtually no incentive to eliminate 
 
 260. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The cause of action supplied by this provision of the APA is generally 
limited to “final agency action.” See, e.g., Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 188–89. Under the APA, an agency 
action is final when it marks the consummation of the agency’s decision-making and when the action 
determines rights or obligations or otherwise has legal consequences. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
177–78 (1997). If a rule is not “final,” then the APA does not provide a cause of action to challenge 
to it. But such a rule must be a rara avis, given that all legislative regulations—which by definition 
have the force and effect of law, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (“A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force 
of law.”)—are necessarily final, as well as many interpretive rules, which do not have the force and 
effect of law, California Cmtys Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019) 
(“[I]nterpretive rules can be final, and, by implication, that the test for finality is independent of the 
analysis for whether an agency action is a legislative rule rather than an interpretive rule.”). 
 261. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B). 
 262. Cf. FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“We think Legi-Tech’s 
analysis is faulty; its assertion that the FEC is unconstitutionally composed cannot be regarded as 
anything other than an affirmative defense against an enforcement proceeding.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 90 cmt. a  (“If the other party to a transaction has acquired a right in property 
or in an employment, or if another has acquired a defense against an action by the principal, the right 
or defense cannot be destroyed by ratification.”). Moose Jooce is the D.C. Circuit’s first decision 
addressing the relationship between this aspect of the traditional ratification doctrine and the Circuit’s 
ratification defense. The decision concludes that any objection to the employment of the ratification 
defense on the ground of its conflict with the traditional rule is precluded by Legi-Tech, “where the 
court held that the Federal Election Commission effectively ratified its prior actions even though its 
ratification occurred after Legi-Tech alleged an Appointments Clause violation.” Moose Jooce, 981 
F.3d at 29. The court’s chronology is correct, but the decision in Legi-Tech does not discuss the 
traditional limitations on ratifications at all, so it can hardly stand as precedent for upholding 
ratification despite its inconsistency with those limitations. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (decisions that do not discuss jurisdiction are not precedent for the existence 
of jurisdiction). 
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entrenched practices that are contrary to the Appointments Clause.263 This 
lack of incentive runs contrary to the principle that maintenance of the 
separation of powers requires heightened judicial vigilance.264 And, like 
similar review-denying doctrines, the ratification defense renders 
constitutional protections “hollow.”265 
To see the negative policy consequences of the D.C. Circuit’s 
ratification defense, one need look no further than the actions of the FDA. 
Over the last two decades, non-officer career employees—who enjoy 
substantial protections against removal by politically appointed 
superiors—have routinely issued regulations, some of which have had 
immense economic and social consequences.266 Yet what did the FDA do 
when, in Moose Jooce, its unconstitutional practice of delegating 
significant federal authority to non-officers was called out in litigation? 
Why, it ratified the action—not once but twice!267 In doing so, the FDA 
precluded the courts from ruling upon its aberrant rulemaking practice,268 
 
 263. See Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Appointment with Trouble, 
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459, 1484 (2011) (“If such ratification were permissible, the Executive Branch 
would have little reason to comply with the Appointments Clause for either principal or inferior 
officers.”). That the executive may be happy with a watering down of the Appointments Clause is no 
reason for the courts to let it happen. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co., Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 497 (2010) (“Perhaps an individual President might find advantages in tying his own hands. But 
the separation of powers does not depend on the views of individual Presidents, nor on whether the 
encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.” (quotations and citations omitted)). Consider 
again the example in Moose Jooce of the Deeming Rule, which “deemed” vaping products to be 
“tobacco products” subject to the Tobacco Control Act. Congress didn’t make that controversial 
decision; neither did the Health and Human Services Secretary; neither did the FDA Commissioner; 
but rather a career civil servant. 
 264. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (“[T]he doctrine of separation 
of powers is a structural safeguard . . . establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls 
and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”). 
 265. Accord Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1797, 1814 (2018) (“[T]he Court’s qualified immunity decisions have nevertheless made it 
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to show that defendants have violated clearly established law, and 
increasingly easy for courts to avoid defining the contours of constitutional rights.”); cf. Mullenix v. 
Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 266. ANGELA C. ERICKSON & THOMAS BERRY, BUT WHO RULES THE RULEMAKERS? 2–3 
(2019) (between 2001 and 2017, 98% of final rules promulgated by FDA were issued by career 
employees). These rulemaking employees were members of the career Senior Executive Service, and 
therefore enjoyed employment protections largely unavailable to politically appointed personnel. See 
Note, The Civil Service and the Statutory Law of Public Employment, 97 HARV L. REV. 1619, 1648 
n.145 (1984). 
 267. To be fair, one of those ratifications happened before litigation commenced, but it was not 
clearly advanced by FDA as a ratification of an employee rule-making until the lawsuit challenging 
the rule had been filed. See Moose Jooce v. FDA, No. 18-cv-203 (CRC), 2020 WL 680143, at *2–3, 
*5 (D.D.C. 2020). 
 268. See id. at *7. 
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which in fact worsened soon after the Moose Jooce litigation began269 
(before it was ultimately abandoned through an agency policy change).270 
Thus, by virtue of the ratification defense, the D.C. Circuit ignores the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that the “[s]eparation of powers, a 
distinctively American political doctrine, profits from the advice authored 
by a distinctively American poet: Good fences make good neighbors.”271 
The defense also gives administrative officials a power that the Supreme 
Court has generally denied to a repeat defendant—namely, the power to 
get out of a case scot-free “simply by ending its unlawful conduct once 
sued,’” yet “then pick up where [it] left off, repeating this cycle until [it] 
achieves all [its] unlawful ends.”272 
Another lamentable consequence of the ratification defense is its 
impeding of the development of Appointments Clause case law, a 
phenomenon that in an analogous context has been called “constitutional 
stagnation.”273 As we have seen, when an official successfully ratifies an 
action, the inquiry ends and the courts do not address whether the ratified 
act violated the Appointments Clause.274 And because these issues have 
not been decided, government actors may persist in decision-making 
practices that may well be unconstitutional. 
***** 
 
 269. During the Moose Jooce litigation, the FDA announced that it had created a Principal 
Associate Commissioner for Policy. See Memorandum from Norman E. Sharpless, Acting Comm’r of 
Food and Drugs, to Officers of the Food and Drug Admin., on Delegation of Authority for General 
Redelegations of Authority § 1(H)(1) (May 2, 2019). Like the Associate Commissioner for Policy, the 
Principal Commissioner for Policy is appointed by the FDA Commissioner. Neither person is 
confirmed by the Senate or appointed by an officer constitutionally authorized to appoint inferior 
officers. 
 270. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human. Servs., HHS Statement on Regulatory 
Process (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/09/20/hhs-statement-on-regulatory-
process.html [https://perma.cc/3ZMQ-WCK4] (“All rules will now be signed by the Secretary and by 
the head of the agency involved.”). One of the last official acts of President Trump was to promulgate 
an executive order generally requiring all agency rules to be issued by politically accountable officials, 
i.e., “senior appointees.” See Exec. Order No. 13,979, § 2, 86 Fed. Reg. 6,813 (Jan. 18, 2021). The 
order was revoked shortly thereafter by President Biden. Exec. Order No. 14,018, § 1, 86 Fed. Reg. 
11,855 (Feb. 24, 2021). 
 271. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995). 
 272. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 n.* (2018) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). 
 273. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 6 (2015). 
 274. See Moose Jooce v. FDA, 981 F.3d 26, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“Even assuming for purposes 
of argument, as appellants object, that Kux’s issuance of the Deeming Rule violated the Appointments 
Clause and that Commissioner Califf’s general ratification of prior actions by the FDA as part of an 
agency reorganization was invalid, Commissioner Gottlieb’s ratification cured any Appointments 
Clause defect.”). 
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The D.C. Circuit’s ratification defense to Appointments Clause 
challenges is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, the common law 
of ratification, an appropriately vigorous enforcement of the separation of 
powers, and the ordered development of constitutional law  
through case-by-case adjudication. The defense should be abandoned. 
This Article recognizes, however, that the D.C. Circuit may be reluctant 
to relinquish the doctrine, given its belief that the only benefit of 
eliminating the defense is “delay.”275 
Thus, as a compromise, this Article recommends, as a second-best 
outcome, that the defense should only be allowed to operate if the 
proposed ratification is subject to all of the substantive and significant 
procedural constraints that normally would apply. This narrowing would 
conform the defense to ratification’s common law origins and its use in 
NRA Political Victory Fund. It would allow the defense to operate in some 
instances where delay really does seem to be the only consequence of a 
rejected ratification—for example, the failure to publish a ratification in 
the Federal Register.276 But it would deny the defense to ratifications that 
did not meet the substantive requirements of rulemaking,277 such as the 
rule that agencies must provide a reasoned explanation for their decisions, 
one which takes into account all of the available evidence.278 
CONCLUSION 
Administrative efficiency is a good thing, but it is not the only or 
most important thing. I suspect that the reason for the D.C. Circuit’s 
embrace of the ratification defense is that it appears to save time—for 
private parties, government agencies, and the courts—without apparently 
prejudicing anyone, because it merely accelerates the inevitable.279 That 
 
 275. Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision, 139 F.3d 203, 214 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 276. See, e.g., Alfa Int’l Seafood v. Ross, 264 F. Supp. 3d 23, 46 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Finally, 
Plaintiffs’ contention that Secretary Ross’ ratification is insufficient because it lacks the formality of 
rulemaking—i.e., publication in the Federal Register—is unfounded.”); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) 
(generally requiring publication in the Federal Register of proposed and final substantive rules). The 
Due Process Clause would, however, limit the extent to which the ratification could have retroactive 
effect and make conduct illegal that, at the time, was legal. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 547–
50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (explaining that retroactive 
imposition of liability to fund health benefits for retired workers violates due process). 
 277. Butte County v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Reasoned decisionmaking is 
not a procedural requirement.”). 
 278. Id. at 194. 
 279. See, e.g., FEC v. Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704, 708–09 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Even were the 
Commission to return to square one—assuming the statute of limitations was not a bar—it is virtually 
inconceivable that its decisions would differ in any way the second time from that which occurred the 
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justification for the defense is, however, particularly out of place in 
Appointments Clause litigation. Even in run-of-the-mill administrative 
law cases, courts are exceedingly reluctant to credit agency claims that a 
remand would be pointless because its outcome is ordained;280 and one 
would think that that reluctance should be greater and not less in cases 
alleging substantial violation of the separation of powers. Moreover, such 
“structural” constitutional errors in other contexts nearly always require a 
redo.281 Yet, as we have seen with the D.C. Circuit’s ratification case law, 
exemplified by its most recent decision in Moose Jooce, a ratification 
defense is by no means a true redo and replacement of the structural error. 
It is rather an admittedly perfunctory “rubberstamp” subject to few of the 
safeguards against arbitrary decision-making that are normally attendant 
on agency action. 
A better approach would be to use ratification sparingly, consistent 
with its common law limitations. A fair argument could be made that 
ratification has no bearing at all in Appointments Clause cases, given the 
importance of strict enforcement of the separation of powers and the poor 
fit between a government official’s “ratification” and the traditional 
principal-agent context of and limitations on ratification. But even if one 
were to give some place to ratification as a defense to Appointment Clause 
challenges to agency action, courts should insist, at the very least, that 
purported ratifications be subject to the same key substantive and 
 
first time. . . . In any event, forcing the Commission to start at the beginning of the administrative 
process, given human nature, promises no more detached and ‘pure’ consideration of the merits of the 
case than the Commission’s ratification decision reflected.”). 
 280. E.g., Advocacy for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The touchstone of our inquiry is thus the agency’s open-mindedness . . . .We 
therefore place the burden on the agency to make a compelling showing that the defects of its earlier 
notice [requesting public comment] were cured by the later one.”); cf. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 
738 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), (“[I]t has always been an acceptable feature of judicial review of 
agency action that a petitioner’s ‘injury’ is redressed by the reviewing court notwithstanding that the 
agency might well subsequently legitimately decide to reach the same result through different 
reasoning.”), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he gravamen of their charge is usually that they have a right that the government 
act in accord with due process principles when it takes action against them, even if such conformance 
may not change the substantive outcome. Causation is in fact present in these cases because it cannot 
be assumed that action in accord with the correct procedures would have produced the same result.”). 
 281. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[D]emand for a clear causal 
link to a party’s harm” would frustrate the “prophylactic” goal of the separation of powers—i.e., 
“establishing high walls and clear distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be 
judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”) quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 
U.S. 211, 239 (1995))). The D.C. Circuit has limited Landry to “the acts of ‘purely decision 
recommending employees.’” Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 
1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131–32). 
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procedural limitations as the original action and that the agency abandon 
the delegation or practice that gave rise to the violation. 
